perceiving that which represents them in the intelligible
Substance of God。 This I do not understand； but I say； the things
by me perceived are known by the understanding； and produced by
the will of an infinite Spirit。 And is not all this most plain
and evident？ Is there any more in it than what a little
observation in our own minds； and that which passeth in them； not
only enables us to conceive； but also obliges us to acknowledge。
。 I think I understand you very clearly； and own the
proof you give of a Deity seems no less evident than it is
surprising。 But； allowing that God is the supreme and universal
Cause of an things； yet； may there not be still a Third Nature
besides Spirits and Ideas？ May we not admit a subordinate and
limited cause of our ideas？ In a word； may there not for all that
be ？
。 How often must I inculcate the same thing？ You allow
the things immediately perceived by sense to exist nowhere
without the mind； but there is nothing perceived by sense which
is not perceived immediately： therefore there is nothing sensible
that exists without the mind。 The Matter； therefore； which you
still insist on is something intelligible； I suppose； something
that may be discovered by reason； and not by sense。
。 You are in the right。 ｛216｝
。 Pray let me know what reasoning your belief of
Matter is grounded on； and what this Matter is； in your present
sense of it。
。 I find myself affected with various ideas； whereof I
know I am not the cause； neither are they the cause of
themselves； or of one another； or capable of subsisting by
themselves； as being altogether inactive； fleeting； dependent
beings。 They have therefore cause distinct from me and
them： of which I pretend to know no more than that it is 。 And this thing； whatever it be； I call
Matter。
。 Tell me； Hylas； hath every one a liberty to change
the current proper signification attached to a common name in any
language？ For example； suppose a traveller should tell you that
in a certain country men pass unhurt through the fire； and； upon
explaining himself； you found he meant by the word fire that
which others call 。 Or； if he should assert that there are
trees that walk upon two legs； meaning men by the term 。
Would you think this reasonable？
。 No； I should think it very absurd。 Common custom is
the standard of propriety in language。 And for any man to affect
speaking improperly is to pervert the use of speech； and can
never serve to a better purpose than to protract and multiply
disputes； where there is no difference in opinion。
。 And doth not ； in the common current
acceptation of the word； signify an extended； solid； moveable；
unthinking； inactive Substance？
。 It doth。
。 And； hath it not been made evident that no
substance can possibly exist？ And； though it should be allowed to
exist； yet how can that which is be a ； or that
which is be a ？ You may； indeed；
if you please； annex to the word a contrary meaning to
what is vulgarly received； and tell me you understand by it； an
unextended； thinking； active being； which is the cause of our
ideas。 But what else is this than to play with words； and run
into that very fault you just now condemned with so much reason？
I do by no means find fault with your reasoning； in that you
collect a cause from the ： I deny that
cause deducible by reason can properly be termed Matter。
。 There is indeed something in what you say。 But I am
｛217｝ afraid you do not thoroughly comprehend my meaning。 I would
by no means be thought to deny that God； or an infinite Spirit；
is the Supreme Cause of all things。 All I contend for is； that；
subordinate to the Supreme Agent； there is a cause of a limited
and inferior nature； which in the production of our
ideas； not by any act of will； or spiritual efficiency； but by
that kind of action which belongs to Matter； viz。 。
。 I find you are at every turn relapsing into your old
exploded conceit； of a moveable； and consequently an extended；
substance； existing without the mind。 What！ Have you already
forgotten you were convinced； or are you willing I should repeat
what has been said on that head？ In truth this is not fair
dealing in you； still to suppose the being of that which you have
so often acknowledged to have no being。 But； not to insist
farther on what has been so largely handled； I ask whether all
your ideas are not perfectly passive and inert； including nothing
of action in them。
。 They are。
。 And are sensible qualities anything else but ideas？
。 How often have I acknowledged that they are not。
。 But is not a sensible quality？
。 It is。
。 Consequently it is no action？
。 I agree with you。 And indeed it is very plain that
when I stir my finger； it remains passive； but my will which
produced the motion is active。
。 Now； I desire to know； in the first place； whether；
motion being allowed to be no action； you can conceive any action
besides volition： and； in the second place； whether to say
something and conceive nothing be not to talk nonsense： and；
lastly； whether； having considered the premises； you do not
perceive that to suppose any efficient or active Cause of our
ideas； other than ； is highly absurd and unreasonable？
。 I give up the point entirely。 But； though Matter may
not be a cause； yet what hinders its being an ；
subservient to the supreme Agent in the production of our ideas？
。 An instrument say you； pray what may be the figure；
springs； wheels； and motions； of that instrument？
。 Those I pretend to determine nothing of； both the
substance and its qualities being entirely unknown to me。
。 What？ You are then of opinion it is made up of ｛218｝
unknown parts； that it hath unknown motions； and an unknown
shape？
。 I do not believe that it hath any figure or motion at
all； being already convinced； that no sensible qualities can
exist in an unperceiving substance。
。 But what notion is it possible to frame of an
instrument void of all sensible qualities； even extension itself？
。 I do not pretend to have any notion of it。
。 And what reason have you to think this unknown； this
inconceivable Somewhat doth exist？ Is it that you imagine God
cannot act as well without it； or that you find by experience the
use of some such thing； when you form ideas in your own mind？
。 You are always teasing me for reasons of my belief。
Pray what reasons have you not to believe it？
。 It is to me a sufficient reason not to believe the
existence of anything； if I see no reason for believing it。 But；
not to insist on reasons for believing； you will not so much as
let me know you would have me believe； since you say
you have no manner of notion of it。 After all； let me entreat you
to consider whether it be like a philosopher； or even like a man
of common sense； to pretend to believe you know not what ' and
you know not why。
。 Hold； Philonous。 When I tell you Matter is an
； I do not mean altogether nothing。 It is true I know
not the particular kind of instrument； but； however； I have some
notion of ； which I apply to it。
。 But what if it should prove that there is something；
even in the most general notion of ； as taken in a
distinct sense from ； which makes the use of it
inconsistent with the Divine attributes？
。 Make that appear and I shall give up the point。
。 What mean you by the general nature or notion of
？
。 That which is common to all particular instruments
composeth the general notion。
。 Is it not common to all instruments； that they are
applied to the doing those things only which cannot be performed
by the mere act of our wills？ Thus； for instance； I never use an
instrument to move my finger； because it is done by a volition。
But I should use one if I were to remove part of a rock； or tear
up a tree by the roots。 Are you of the same mind？ ｛219｝ Or； can
you shew any example where an instrument is made use of in
producing an effect depending on the will of the
agent？
。 I own I cannot。
。 How therefore can you suppose that an All…perfect
Spirit； on whose Will all things have an absolute and immediate
dependence； should need an instrument in his operations； or； not
needing it； make use of it？ Thus it seems to me that you are
obliged to own the use of a lifeless inactive instrument to be
incompatible with the infinite perfection of God； that is； by
your own confession； to give up the point。
。 It doth not readily occur what I can answer you。
。 But； methinks you should be ready to own the truth；
when it has bee