the critique of pure reason- 第65部分

understanding　is　perfectly　ignorant；　for　it　has　to　do　only　with

objects　of　a　possible　experience；　the　cognition　and　synthesis　of　which

is　always　conditioned。　The　unconditioned；　if　it　does　really　exist；

must　be　especially　considered　in　regard　to　the　determinations　which

distinguish　it　from　whatever　is　conditioned；　and　will　thus　afford　us

material　for　many　a　priori　synthetical　propositions。

　　The　principles　resulting　from　this　highest　principle　of　pure

reason　will；　however；　be　transcendent　in　relation　to　phenomena；　that

is　to　say；　it　will　be　impossible　to　make　any　adequate　empirical　use　of

this　principle。　It　is　therefore　completely　different　from　all

principles　of　the　understanding；　the　use　made　of　which　is　entirely

immanent；　their　object　and　purpose　being　merely　the　possibility　of

experience。　Now　our　duty　in　the　transcendental　dialectic　is　as

follows。　To　discover　whether　the　principle　that　the　series　of

conditions　（in　the　synthesis　of　phenomena；　or　of　thought　in　general）

extends　to　the　unconditioned　is　objectively　true；　or　not；　what

consequences　result　therefrom　affecting　the　empirical　use　of　the

understanding；　or　rather　whether　there　exists　any　such　objectively

valid　proposition　of　reason；　and　whether　it　is　not；　on　the　contrary；　a

merely　logical　precept　which　directs　us　to　ascend　perpetually　to　still

higher　conditions；　to　approach　completeness　in　the　series　of　them；　and

thus　to　introduce　into　our　cognition　the　highest　possible　unity　of

reason。　We　must　ascertain；　I　say；　whether　this　requirement　of　reason

has　not　been　regarded；　by　a　misunderstanding；　as　a　transcendental

principle　of　pure　reason；　which　postulates　a　thorough　completeness

in　the　series　of　conditions　in　objects　themselves。　We　must　show；

moreover；　the　misconceptions　and　illusions　that　intrude　into

syllogisms；　the　major　proposition　of　which　pure　reason　has　supplied…　a

proposition　which　has　perhaps　more　of　the　character　of　a　petitio

than　of　a　postulatum…　and　that　proceed　from　experience　upwards　to

its　conditions。　The　solution　of　these　problems　is　our　task　in

transcendental　dialectic；　which　we　are　about　to　expose　even　at　its

source；　that　lies　deep　in　human　reason。　We　shall　divide　it　into　two

parts；　the　first　of　which　will　treat　of　the　transcendent　conceptions

of　pure　reason；　the　second　of　transcendent　and　dialectical　syllogisms。

　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　BOOK　I。



　　　　　　　　　　　　　OF　THE　CONCEPTIONS　OF　PURE　REASON。



　　The　conceptions　of　pure　reason…　we　do　not　here　speak　of　the

possibility　of　them…　are　not　obtained　by　reflection；　but　by

inference　or　conclusion。　The　conceptions　of　understanding　are　also

cogitated　a　priori　antecedently　to　experience；　and　render　it　possible；

but　they　contain　nothing　but　the　unity　of　reflection　upon　phenomena；

in　so　far　as　these　must　necessarily　belong　to　a　possible　empirical

consciousness。　Through　them　alone　are　cognition　and　the

determination　of　an　object　possible。　It　is　from　them；　accordingly；

that　we　receive　material　for　reasoning；　and　antecedently　to　them　we

possess　no　a　priori　conceptions　of　objects　from　which　they　might　be

deduced；　On　the　other　hand；　the　sole　basis　of　their　objective

reality　consists　in　the　necessity　imposed　on　them；　as　containing　the

intellectual　form　of　all　experience；　of　restricting　their

application　and　influence　to　the　sphere　of　experience。

　　But　the　term；　conception　of　reason；　or　rational　conception；　itself

indicates　that　it　does　not　confine　itself　within　the　limits　of

experience；　because　its　object…matter　is　a　cognition；　of　which　every

empirical　cognition　is　but　a　part…　nay；　the　whole　of　possible

experience　may　be　itself　but　a　part　of　it…　a　cognition　to　which　no

actual　experience　ever　fully　attains；　although　it　does　always

pertain　to　it。　The　aim　of　rational　conceptions　is　the　comprehension；

as　that　of　the　conceptions　of　understanding　is　the　understanding　of

perceptions。　If　they　contain　the　unconditioned；　they　relate　to　that　to

which　all　experience　is　subordinate；　but　which　is　never　itself　an

object　of　experience…　that　towards　which　reason　tends　in　all　its

conclusions　from　experience；　and　by　the　standard　of　which　it　estimates

the　degree　of　their　empirical　use；　but　which　is　never　itself　an

element　in　an　empirical　synthesis。　If；　notwithstanding；　such

conceptions　possess　objective　validity；　they　may　be　called　conceptus

ratiocinati　（conceptions　legitimately　concluded）；　in　cases　where

they　do　not；　they　have　been　admitted　on　account　of　having　the

appearance　of　being　correctly　concluded；　and　may　be　called　conceptus

ratiocinantes　（sophistical　conceptions）。　But　as　this　can　only　be

sufficiently　demonstrated　in　that　part　of　our　treatise　which　relates

to　the　dialectical　conclusions　of　reason；　we　shall　omit　any

consideration　of　it　in　this　place。　As　we　called　the　pure　conceptions

of　the　understanding　categories；　we　shall　also　distinguish　those　of

pure　reason　by　a　new　name　and　call　them　transcendental　ideas。　These

terms；　however；　we　must　in　the　first　place　explain　and　justify。



　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　SECTION　I　…　Of　Ideas　in　General。



　　Despite　the　great　wealth　of　words　which　European　languages

possess；　the　thinker　finds　himself　often　at　a　loss　for　an　expression

exactly　suited　to　his　conception；　for　want　of　which　he　is　unable　to

make　himself　intelligible　either　to　others　or　to　himself。　To　coin

new　words　is　a　pretension　to　legislation　in　language　which　is　seldom

successful；　and；　before　recourse　is　taken　to　so　desperate　an

expedient；　it　is　advisable　to　examine　the　dead　and　learned

languages；　with　the　hope　and　the　probability　that　we　may　there　meet

with　some　adequate　expression　of　the　notion　we　have　in　our　minds。　In

this　case；　even　if　the　original　meaning　of　the　word　has　become

somewhat　uncertain；　from　carelessness　or　want　of　caution　on　the　part

of　the　authors　of　it；　it　is　always　better　to　adhere　to　and　confirm　its

proper　meaning…　even　although　it　may　be　doubtful　whether　it　was

formerly　used　in　exactly　this　sense…　than　to　make　our　labour　vain　by

want　of　sufficient　care　to　render　ourselves　intelligible。

　　For　this　reason；　when　it　happens　that　there　exists　only　a　single

word　to　express　a　certain　conception；　and　this　word；　in　its　usual

acceptation；　is　thoroughly　adequate　to　the　conception；　the　accurate

distinction　of　which　from　related　conceptions　is　of　great

importance；　we　ought　not　to　employ　the　expression　improvidently；　or；

for　the　sake　of　variety　and　elegance　of　style；　use　it　as　a　synonym　for

other　cognate　words。　It　is　our　duty；　on　the　contrary；　carefully　to

preserve　its　peculiar　signification；　as　otherwise　it　easily　happens

that　when　the　attention　of　the　reader　is　no　longer　particularly

attracted　to　the　expression；　and　it　is　lost　amid　the　multitude　of

other　words　of　very　different　import；　the　thought　which　it　conveyed；

and　which　it　alone　conveyed；　is　lost　with　it。

　　Plato　employed　the　expression　idea　in　a　way　that　plainly　showed　he

meant　by　it　something　which　is　never　derived　from　the　senses；　but

which　far　transcends　even　the　conceptions　of　the　understanding　（with

which　Aristotle　occupied　himself）；　inasmuch　as　in　experience　nothing

perfectly　corresponding　to　them　could　be　found。　Ideas　are；　according

to　him；　archetypes　of　things　themselves；　and　not　merely　keys　to

possible　experiences；　like　the　categories。　In　his　view　they　flow

from　the　highest　reason；　by　which　they　have　been　imparted　to　human

reason；　which；　however；　exists　no　longer　in　its　original　state；　but　is

obliged　with　great　labour　to　recall　by　reminiscence…　which　is　called

philosophy…　the　old　but　now　sadly　obscured　ideas。　I　will　not　here

enter　upon　any　literary　investigation　of　the　sense　which　this

sublime　philosopher　attached　to　this　expression。　I　shall　content

myself　with　remarking　that　it　is　nothing　unusual；　in　common

conversation　as　well　as　in　written　works；　by　comparing　the　thoughts

which　an　author　has　delivered　upon　a　subject；　to　understand　him　better

than　he　understood　himself　inasmuch　as　he　may　not　have　sufficiently

determined　his　conception；　and　thus　have　sometimes　spoken；　nay　even

thought；　in　opposition　to　his　own　opinions。

　　Plato　perceived　very　clearly　that　our　faculty　of　cognition　has　the

feeling　of　a　much　higher　vocation　than　that　of　merely　spelling　out

phenomena　according　to　synthetical　unity；　for　the　purpose　of　being

able　to　read　them　as　experience；　and　that　our　reason　naturally

raises　itself　to　cognitions　far　too　elevated　to　admit　of　the

possibility　of　an　object　given　by　experience　corresponding　to　them…

cognitions　which　are　nevertheless　real；　and　are　not　mere　phantoms　of

the　brain。

　　This　philosopher　found　his　ideas　especially　in　all　that　is

practical；*　that　is；　which　rests　upon　freedom；　which　in　its　turn　ranks

under　cognitions　that　are　the　peculiar　product　of　reason。　He　who　would

derive　from　experience　the　conceptions　of　virtue；　who　would　make　（as

many　have　really　done）　that；　which　at　best　can　but　serve　as　an

imperfectly　illustrative　example；　a　model　for　or　the　fo