the fact of judging taken for the actual deed； and instead of proving its uprightness and honesty by
acts does so by expressing fine sentiments。 It is thus constituted entirely in the same way as that
against which。 the reproach is made of putting its phrases in place of duty。 In both alike the aspect
of reality is distinct from the express statements — in the one owing to the selfish purpose of the
action； in the other through failure to act at all； although the necessity of acting is involved in the
very speaking of duty； for duty without deeds is altogether meaningless。
The act of judging； however； has also to be looked at as a positive act of thought and has a
positive content： this aspect makes the contradiction present in the apprehending consciousness；
and its identity with the first consciousness； still more complete。 The active consciousness declares
its specific deed to be its duty； and the consciousness that passes judgment cannot deny this； for
duty as such is form void of all content and capable of any。 In other words； concrete action；
inherently implying diversity in its manysidedness； involves the universal aspect； which is that which
is taken as duty； just as much as the particular； which constitutes the share and interest the
individual has in the act。 Now the judging consciousness does not stop at the former aspect of
duty and rest content with the knowledge which the active agent has of this； viz。 that this is his
duty； the condition and the status of his reality。 It holds on to the other aspect； diverts the act into
the inner realm； and explains the act from selfish motives and from its inner intention； an intention
different from the act itself。 As every act is capable of treatment in respect of its dutifulness； so；
too； each can be considered from this other point of view of particularity； for as an act it is the
reality of an individual。
This process of judging； then； takes the act out of the sphere of its objective existence； and turns it
back into the inner subjective sphere； into the form of private or individual particularity。 If the act
carries glory with it； then the inner sphere is judged as love of fame。 If it is altogether conformity
with the position of the individual； without going beyond this position； and is so constituted that the
individuality in question does not have the position attached to it as an external feature； but through
itself supplies concrete filling to this universality； and by that very process shows itself to be
capable of a higher station…then the inner nature of the act is judged as ambition； and so on。 Since；
in the act in general； the individual who acts comes to see himself in objective form； or gets the
feeling of his own being in his objective existence and thus attains enjoyment； the judgment on the
act finds the inner nature of it to be an impulse towards personal happiness； even though this
happiness were to consist merely in inner moral vanity； the enjoyment of a sense of personal
excellence； and in the foretaste and hope of a happiness to come。
No act can escape being judged in such a way； for 〃duty for duty's sake〃； this pure purpose； is
something unreal。 What reality it has lies in the deed of some individuality； and the action thereby
has in it the aspect of particularity。 No hero is a hero to his valet； not； however； because the hero
is not a hero； but because the valet is — the valet； with whom the hero has to do； not as a hero；
but as a man who eats； drinks； and dresses； who； in short； appears as a private individual with
certain personal wants and ideas of his own。 In the same way； there is no act in which that process
of judgment cannot oppose the personal aspect of the individuality to the universal aspect of the
act； and play the part of the 〃moral〃 valet towards the agent。（8）
The consciousness； that so passes judgment； is in consequence itself base and mean； because it
divides the act up； and produces and holds to the act's self…discordance。 It is； furthermore；
hypocrisy； because it gives out this way of judging； not as another fashion of being wicked； but as
the correct consciousness of the act； sets itself up； in its unreality； in this vanity of knowing well and
better； far above the deeds it decries； and wants to find its mere words without deeds taken for an
admirable kind of reality。
On this account； then； putting itself on a level with the agent on whom it passes judgment； it is
recognized by the latter as the same as himself。 This latter does not merely find himself
apprehended as something alien to； and discordant with； that other： but rather finds the other in its
peculiar constitutive character identical with himself。 Seeing this identity and giving this expression；
he openly confesses himself to the other； and expects in like manner that the other； having in point
of fact put itself on the same level； will respond in the same language； will therein give voice to this
identity； and that thus the state of mutual recognition will be brought about。 His confession is not an
attitude of abasement or humiliation before the other； is not throwing himself away。 For to give the
matter expression in this way has not the one…sided character which would fix and establish his
disparity with the other： on the contrary； it is solely because of seeing the identity of the other with
him that he gives himself utterance。 In making his confession he announces； from his side； their
common identity； and does so for the reason that language is the existence of spirit as an
immediate self。 He thus expects that the other will make its own contribution to this manner of
existence。
But the admission on the part of the one who is wicked； 〃I am so〃； is not followed by a reply
making a similar confession。 This was not what that way of judging meant at all： far from it！ It
repels this community of nature； and is the 〃hardheartedness〃； which keeps to itself and rejects all
continuity with the other。 By so doing the scene is changed。 The one who made the confession
sees himself thrust off； and takes the other to be in the wrong when he refuses to let his own inner
nature go forth in the objective shape of an express utterance； when he contrasts the beauty of his
own soul with the wicked individual； and opposes to the confession of the penitent the stiffnecked
attitude of the self…consistent equable character； and the rigid silence of one who keeps himself to
himself and refuses to throw himself away for some one else。 Here we find asserted the highest
pitch of revolt to which a spirit certain of itself can reach。 For it beholds itself； qua this simple
self…knowledge； in another conscious being； and in such a way that even the external form of this
other is not an unessential 〃thing〃； as in the case of an object of wealth； but thought； knowledge
itself is what is held opposed to it。 It is this absolutely fluid continuity of pure knowledge which
refuses to establish communication with an other； which had； ipso facto； by making its confession；
renounced separate isolated self…existence； had affirmed its particularity to be cancelled； and
thereby established itself as continuous with the other； i。e。 established itself as universal。 The other
however； in its own case reserves for itself its uncommunicative； isolated independence： in the case
of the individual confessing； it reserves for him the very same independence； though the latter has
already cast that away。 It thereby proves itself to be a form of consciousness which is forsaken by
and denies the very nature of spirit； for it does not understand that spirit； in the absolute certainty
of itself； is master and lord over every deed； and over all reality； and can reject and cast them off
and make them as if they had never been。 At the same time； it does not see the contradiction it is
committing in not allowing a rejection； which has been made in express language； to pass for
genuine rejection； while itself has the certainty of its own spiritual life； not in a concrete real act； but
in its inner nature； and finds the objective existence of this inner being in the language of its own
judgment。 It is thus its own self which checks that other's return from the act to the spiritual
objectivity of language； and to spiritual identity； and by its harshness produces the discordance
which still remains。
Now； so far as the spirit which is certain of itself； in the form of a 〃beautiful soul〃； does not possess
the strength to relinquish the self…absorbed uncommunicative knowledge of itself； it cannot attain to
any identity with the consciousness that is repulsed； and so cannot succeed in seeing the unity of its
self in another life； cannot reach objective existence。 The identity comes about； therefore； merely in
a negative way； as a state of being devoid of spiritual character。 The 〃beautiful soul〃； then； has no
concrete reality； it subsists in the contradiction between its pure self and the necessity felt by this
self to externalize itself and turn into something actual； it exists in the immediacy of this rooted and
fixed opposition； an immediacy which alone is the middle term reconciling an opposition which has
been intensified to its pu