conscious individual： the former the spherical surface； the latter the centre reflectively representing
that surface within it。
But the spherical surface； the world for the individual； carries on the face of it this double meaning：
it is in and for itself the actual world and situation； and it is the world of the individual。 It is the
world of the individual either in so far as this individual was merely fused and blended with it； had
let that world； just as it is； pass into its own nature； and had taken up towards it merely the attitude
of a formal consciousness； or； on the other hand； it is the world of the individual in the sense in
which the given has been transformed and transmuted by that individual。
Since reality is capable of having this twofold meaning on account of this freedom of the individual；
the world of the individual is only to be understood from the individual himself； and the influence of
reality upon the individual； a reality which is represented as having a being all its own （an und für
sich）； receives through this individual absolutely the opposite significance — the individual either
lets the stream of reality flowing in upon it have its way； or breaks off and diverts the current of its
influence。 In consequence of this； however； 〃 psychological necessity〃 becomes an empty phrase；
so empty that there is the absolute possibility that what is said to have this influence could equally
well not have had it。
Herewith drops out of account that existence which was to be something all by itself； and was
meant to constitute one aspect； and that the universal aspect； of a law。 Individuality is what its
world； in the sense of its own world； is。 Individuality itself is the cycle of its own action； in which it
has presented and established itself as reality； and is simply and solely a unity of what is given and
what is constructed — a unity aspects do not fall apart； as in the idea of psychological law； into a
world given per se and an individuality existing for itself。 Or if those aspects are thus considered
each by itself； there is no necessity to be found between them； and no law of their relation to one
another。
c
Observation of the Relation of Self…Consciousness
to its Immediate Actuality —
Physiognomy & Phrenology。 （1）
PSYCHOLOGICAL observation discovers no law for the relation of self…consciousness to
actuality or the world over against it； and owing to their mutual indifference it is forced to fall back
on the peculiar determinate characteristic of real individuality； which has a being in and for itself or
contains the opposition of subjective self…existence （Fürsichseyn） and objective inherent
existence （Ansichseyn） dissolved and extinguished within its own process of absolute mediation。
Individuality is now the object for observation； or the object to which observation now passes。
The individual exists in himself and for himself。 He is for himself； or is a free activity； he is；
however； also in himself； or has himself an original determinate being of his own — a character
which is in principle the same as what psychology sought to find outside him。 Opposition thus
breaks out in his own self； it has this twofold nature； it is a process or movement of consciousness；
and it is the fixed being of a reality with a phenomenal character； a reality which in it is directly its
own。 This being； the 〃body〃 of the determinate individuality； is its original source； that in the making
of which it has had nothing to do。 But since the individual at the same time merely is what he has
done； his body is also an 〃expression〃 of himself which he has brought about； a sign and indication
as well； which has not remained a bare immediate fact； but through which the individual only
makes known what is actually implied by his setting his original nature to work。
If we consider the moments we have here in relation to the view previously indicated； we find a
general human shape and form； or at least the general character of a climate； of a portion of the
world； of a people； just as formerly we found in the same way general customs and culture。 In
addition the particular circumstances and situation are within the universal reality； here this
particular reality is a particular formation of the shape of the individual。 On the other side； whereas
formerly we were dealing with the free activity of the individual； and reality in the sense of his own
reality was put in contrast and opposition to reality as given； here the shape assumed by the
individual stands as an expression of his own actualization established by the individual himself； it
bears the lineaments and forms of his spontaneously active being。 But the reality； both universal as
well as particular； which observation formerly found outside the individual； is here the actual reality
of the individual； his connate body； and within this very body the expression due to his own action
appears。 From the psychological point of view objective reality in and for itself and determinate
individuality had to be brought into relation to one another； here； however； it is the whole
determinate individuality that is the object for observation； and each aspect of the opposition it
entails is itself this whole。 Thus； to the outer whole belongs not merely the original primordial being；
the connate body； but the formation of the body as well； which is due to activity from the inner
side； the body is a unity of unformed and formed existence； and is the reality of the individual
permeated by his reference to self。 This whole embraces the definite parts fixed originally and from
the first； and also the lineaments which arise only as the result of action； this whole so formed is；
and this being is an expression of what is inner； of the individual constituted as a consciousness and
as a process。
This inner is； too； no longer formal； spontaneous activity without any content or determinateness of
its own； an activity With its content and specific nature； as in the former case； lying in external
circumstances； it is an original inherently determinate Character； whose form alone is the activity。
What； then； we have to consider here is the relation subsisting between the two sides； the point to
observe is how this relation is determined； and what is to be understood by the inner finding
expression in the outer。
This outer； in the first place； does not act as an organ making the inner visible； or； in general terms；
a being for another； for the inner； so far as it is in the organ； is the activity itself。 The mouth that
speaks； the hand that works； with the legs too； if we care to add them； are the operative organs
effecting the actual realization； and they contain the action qua action； or the inner as such； the
externality； however； which the inner obtains by their means is the deed； the act； in the sense of a
reality separated and cut off from the individual。 Language and labour are outer expressions in
which the individual no longer retains possession of himself per se； but lets the inner get right
outside him； and surrenders it to something else。 For that reason we might just as truly say that
these outer expressions express the inner too much as that they do so too little： too much —
because the inner itself breaks out in them； and there remains no opposition between them and it；
they not merely give an expression of the inner； they give the inner itself directly and immediately：
too little — because in speech and action the inner turns itself into something else； into an other；
and thereby puts itself at the mercy of the element of change； which transforms the spoken word
and the accomplished act； and makes something else out of them than they are in and for
themselves as actions of a particular determinate individual。 Not only do the products of actions；
owing to this externality； lose by the influence of others the character of being something constant
vis…a…vis other individualities； but by their assuming towards the inner which they contain； the
attitude of something external； separate； independent； and indifferent； they can； through the
individual himself； be qua inner something other than they seem。 Either the individual intentionally
makes them in appearance something else than they are in truth； or he is too incompetent to give
himself the outer aspect be really wanted； and to give them such fixity and permanence that the
product of his action cannot become misrepresented by others。 The action； then； in the form of a
completed product has the double and opposite significance of being either the inner individuality
and not its expression； or； qua external； a reality detached from the inner； a reality which is
something quite different from the inner。 On account of this ambiguity； we must look about for the
inner as it still is within the individual himself； but in a visible or external form。 In the organ；
however； it exists merely as immediate activity as such； which attains its externalization in the act or
deed； that either does or again does not represent the inner。 The organ； in the light of this
opposition； thus does not afford