this demand refers to knowing in general — 〃we ought to know〃。 What is demanded is； therefore；
strictly speaking； something independent of every specific content。 But here the whole point of the
statement concerned a definite content； a distinction involved in the substance of the ethical life。
Yet this immediate determination of that substance is a content of such a kind as turned out really
to be a complete contingency； and when we try to get the required universality and necessity by
making the law refer to the knowledge ＇instead of to the content＇； then the content really
disappears altogether。
Another celebrated command runs： 〃Love thy neighbour as thyself。〃 It is directed to an individual
standing in relation to another individual； and asserts this law as a relation of a particular individual
to a particular individual； i。e。 a relation of sentiment or feeling （Empfindung）。 Active love — for an
inactive love has no existence； and is therefore doubtless not intended here（1） — aims at removing
evil from someone and bringing him good。 To do this we have to distinguish what the evil is； what
is the appropriate good to meet this evil； and what in general his well…being consists in； i。e。 we
have to love him intelligently。 Unintelligent love will do him harm perhaps more than hatred。
Intelligent； veritable （wesentlich） well…doing is； however； in its richest and most important form the
intelligent universal action of the state — an action compared with which the action of a particular
individual as such is something altogether so trifling that it is hardly worth talking about。 The action
of the state is in this connexion of such great weight and strength that if the action of the individual
were to oppose it； and either sought to be straightway and deliberately （für sich） criminal； or out
of love for another wanted to cheat the universal out of the right and claim which it has upon him；
such action would be useless and would inevitably be annihilated。 Hence all that well…doing； which
lies in sentiment and feeling； can mean is an action wholly and solely particular； a help at need；
which is as contingent as it is momentary。 Chance determines not merely its occasion； but also
whether it is a 〃work〃 at all； whether it is not at once dissipated again； and whether it does not
itself really turn to evil。 Thus this sort of action for the good of others； which is given out as
necessary； is so constituted that it may just as likely not exist as exist； is such that if the occasion
by chance arises； it may possibly be a 〃work〃； may possibly be good； but just as likely may not。
This law； therefore； has as little of a universal content as the first above considered； and fails to
express anything substantial； something objectively real per se （an und für sich）； which it should
do if it is to be an absolute ethical law。 In other words； such laws never get further than the 〃ought
to be〃； they have no actual reality； they are not laws； but merely commands。
It is； however； in point of fact； clear from the very nature of the case that we must renounce all
claim to an absolute universal content。 For every specific determination which the simple substance
（and its very nature consists in being simple） might obtain is inadequate to its nature。 The command
itself in its simple absoluteness expresses immediate ethical existence； the distinction appearing in it
is a specific determinate element； and thus a content standing under the absolute universality of this
simple existence。 Since； then； an absolute content must thus be renounced； formal universality is
the only kind that is possible and suitable； and this means merely that it is not to contradict itself。
For universality devoid of content is formal； and an absolute content amounts to a distinction which
is no distinction； i。e。 means absence of content。（2）
In default of all content there is thus nothing left with which to make a law but the bare form of
universality； in fact； the mere tautology of consciousness； a tautology which stands over against the
content； and consists in a knowledge； not of the content actually existing； the content proper； but
of its ultimate essence only； a knowledge of its self…identity。
The ethical inner essence is consequently not itself ipso facto a content； but only a standard for
deciding whether a content is capable of being a law or not； i。e。 whether the content does not
contradict itself。 Reason as law…giver is reduced to being reason as criterion； instead of laying
down laws reason now only tests what is laid down。
1。 Cp。 Kant； Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals： Sect。 1 Critique of Practical Reason：
Analytic c。 3。
2。 The above criticism applies to Kant's 〃categorical imperative〃。
c
Reason as Testing Laws
A DIFFERENCE within the bare and simple ethical substance is for it an accident； which； in the
case of determinate commands； as we saw； appeared as contingency in the knowledge of the
circumstances and contingency in action。 The comparison of that simple existence with the
determinateness which was inadequate to its nature took place in us； and the simple substance was
then seen to be formal universality or pure consciousness which holds itself free from and in
opposition to the content； and is a knowledge of that content as something determinate。 The
universality in this way remains the same as what the objectified intent was。 But in consciousness
this universality is something different； it is no longer the genus； inert and void of thought； but is
related to the particular and valid as its force and truth。
This consciousness at first seems the same process of testing which formerly we carried on； and its
action seems unable to be anything else than has already taken place — a comparison of the
universal with the determinate particular which would yield as formerly their mutual incongruity。
But the relation of content to universal is different here； since this universal has got another
significance。 It is formal universality； of which the specific consent is capable； for in that
universality the content is considered merely in relation to itself。 When we were applying the test；
the universal solid substance stood over against that specificity； which proved to be a contingent
element of the consciousness into which the substance entered。 Here one term of the comparison
has vanished； the universal is no longer the existing substance with a value all its own； is no longer
substantive right per se； but simple knowledge or form； which compares a content merely with
itself； and looks at it to see if it is a tautology。 Laws are no longer given； but examined and tested；
and for that consciousness which applies the test the laws are already given。 It picks up their
content as simply there； without going into the consideration （as was done before） of the
particularity and contingency attaching to its reality； instead of this it takes its stand by the
command as command； and takes up an attitude towards this command just as direct and simple
as ＇the fact of＇ its being a standard and criterion for criticizing it。
For that reason； however； this process of testing does not get very far。 Just because the standard
is a tautology and indifferent to the content； it accepts one content just as readily as the opposite。
Suppose the question is： — ought it to be a law without qualification （an und für sich） that there
should be property？ Without qualification； and not because of utility for other ends： — the essential
ethical truth consists just in the fact that the law should be merely a self…consistent whole （sich
selbst gleiche）； and through being identical with itself have its ground in its own essential nature；
and not be something conditioned。 Property per se does not contradict itself。 It is a specifically
determinate isolated element； or merely self…identical （sich selbst gleich）。 Absence of property；
absence of ownership of things； or again； community of goods； contradicts itself just as little。 That
something belong to nobody at all； or to the first best man who puts himself in possession； or；
again； to all together； and to each according to his need or in equal portions — that is a simple
characteristic； a formal thought； like its opposite； property。
If indeed no one is master of a thing and it is looked at as a necessary object for human
requirement； then it is necessary that it should become the possession of some particular individual；
and the contradiction would rather lie in making a law out of the freedom of the thing。 By the thing
being without an owner is meant； however； not absolute freedom from ownership； but that it shall
come into someone's possession according to the need of the individual； and； moreover； not in
order to be kept but directly to be used。 But to make provision for need in such an entirely
haphazard manner is contradictory to the nature of the conscious being； with whom alone we have
here to do。 For such a being has to think of his need in a universal way； to look to his existence in
its entirety； and procure himself a permanent lasting good。 This being so； the