t the punishment should be proportioned to the offence； meaning that it should be exactly measured by the moral guilt of the culprit （whatever be their standard for measuring moral guilt）： the consideration； what amount of punishment is necessary to deter from the offence； having nothing to do with the question of justice； in their estimation： while there are others to whom that consideration is all in all； who maintain that it is not just； at least for man； to inflict on a fellow creature； whatever may be his offences； any amount of suffering beyond the least that will suffice to prevent him from repeating； and others from imitating； his misconduct。 To take another example from a subject already once referred to。 In a co…operative industrial association； is it just or not that talent or skill should give a title to superior remuneration？ On the negative side of the question it is argued； that whoever does the best he can； deserves equally well； and ought not in justice to be put in a position of inferiority for no fault of his own； that superior abilities have already advantages more than enough； in the admiration they excite； the personal influence they command； and the internal sources of satisfaction attending them； without adding to these a superior share of the world's goods； and that society is bound in justice rather to make compensation to the less favoured； for this unmerited inequality of advantages； than to aggravate it。 On the contrary side it is contended； that society receives more from the more efficient labourer； that his services being more useful； society owes him a larger return for them； that a greater share of the joint result is actually his work； and not to allow his claim to it is a kind of robbery； that if he is only to receive as much as others； he can only be justly required to produce as much； and to give a smaller amount of time and exertion； proportioned to his superior efficiency。 Who shall decide between these appeals to conflicting principles of justice？ justice has in this case two sides to it； which it is impossible to bring into harmony； and the two disputants have chosen opposite sides； the one looks to what it is just that the individual should receive； the other to what it is just that the community should give。 Each； from his own point of view； is unanswerable； and any choice between them； on grounds of justice； must be perfectly arbitrary。 Social utility alone can decide the preference。 How many； again； and how irreconcilable； are the standards of justice to which reference is made in discussing the repartition of taxation。 One opinion is； that payment to the State should be in numerical proportion to pecuniary means。 Others think that justice dictates what they term graduated taxation； taking a higher percentage from those who have more to spare。 In point of natural justice a strong case might be made for disregarding means altogether； and taking the same absolute sum （whenever it could be got） from every one： as the subscribers to a mess； or to a club； all pay the same sum for the same privileges； whether they can all equally afford it or not。 Since the protection （it might be said） of law and government is afforded to； and is equally required by all； there is no injustice in making all buy it at the same price。 It is reckoned justice； not injustice； that a dealer should charge to all customers the same price for the same article； not a price varying according to their means of payment。 This doctrine； as applied to taxation； finds no advocates； because it conflicts so strongly with man's feelings of humanity and of social expediency； but the principle of justice which it invokes is as true and as binding as those which can be appealed to against it。 Accordingly it exerts a tacit influence on the line of defence employed for other modes of assessing taxation。 People feel obliged to argue that the State does more for the rich than for the poor； as a justification for its taking more from them： though this is in reality not true； for the rich would be far better able to protect themselves； in the absence of law or government； than the poor； and indeed would probably be successful in converting the poor into their slaves。 Others； again； so far defer to the same conception of justice； as to maintain that all should pay an equal capitation tax for the protection of their persons （these being of equal value to all）； and an unequal tax for the protection of their property； which is unequal。 To this others reply； that the all of one man is as valuable to him as the all of another。 From these confusions there is no other mode of extrication than the utilitarian。
Is； then the difference between the just and the Expedient a merely imaginary distinction？ Have mankind been under a delusion in thinking that justice is a more sacred thing than policy； and that the latter ought only to be listened to after the former has been satisfied？ By no means。 The exposition we have given of the nature and origin of the sentiment； recognises a real distinction； and no one of those who profess the most sublime contempt for the consequences of actions as an element in their morality； attaches more importance to the distinction than I do。 While I dispute the pretensions of any theory which sets up an imaginary standard of justice not grounded on utility； I account the justice which is grounded on utility to be the chief part； and incomparably the most sacred and binding part； of all morality。 justice is a name for certain classes of moral rules； which concern the essentials of human well…being more nearly； and are therefore of more absolute obligation； than any other rules for the guidance of life； and the notion which we have found to be of the essence of the idea of justice； that of a right residing in an individual implies and testifies to this more binding obligation。 The moral rules which forbid mankind to hurt one another （in which we must never forget to include wrongful interference with each other's freedom） are more vital to human well…being than any maxims； however important； which only point out the best mode of managing some department of human affairs。 They have also the peculiarity； that they are the main element in determining the whole of the social feelings of mankind。 It is their observance which alone preserves peace among human beings： if obedience to them were not the rule； and disobedience the exception； every one would see in every one else an enemy； against whom he must be perpetually guarding himself。 What is hardly less important； these are the precepts which mankind have the strongest and the most direct inducements for impressing upon one another。 By merely giving to each other prudential instruction or exhortation； they may gain； or think they gain； nothing： in inculcating on each other the duty of positive beneficence they have an unmistakable interest； but far less in degree： a person may possibly not need the benefits of others； but he always needs that they should not do him hurt。 Thus the moralities which protect every individual from being harmed by others； either directly or by being hindered in his freedom of pursuing his own good； are at once those which he himself has most at heart； and those which he has the strongest interest in publishing and enforcing by word and deed。 It is by a person's observance of these that his fitness to exist as one of the fellowship of human beings is tested and decided； for on that depends his being a nuisance or not to those with whom he is in contact。 Now it is these moralities primarily which compose the obligations of justice。 The most marked cases of injustice； and those which give the tone to the feeling of repugnance which characterises the sentiment； are acts of wrongful aggression； or wrongful exercise of power over some one； the next are those which consist in wrongfully withholding from him something which is his due； in both cases； inflicting on him a positive hurt； either in the form of direct suffering； or of the privation of some good which he had reasonable ground； either of a physical or of a social kind； for counting upon。 The same powerful motives which command the observance of these primary moralities； enjoin the punishment of those who violate them； and as the impulses of self…defence； of defence of others； and of vengeance； are all called forth against such persons； retribution； or evil for evil； becomes closely connected with the sentiment of justice； and is universally included in the idea。 Good for good is also one of the dictates of justice； and this； though its social utility is evident； and though it carries with it a natural human feeling； has not at first sight that obvious connection with hurt or injury； which； existing in the most elementary cases of just and unjust； is the source of the characteristic intensity of the sentiment。 But the connection； though less obvious； is not less real。 He who accepts benefits； and denies a return of them when needed； inflicts a real hurt； by disappointing one of the most natural and reasonable of expectations； and one which he must at least tacitly have encouraged； otherwise the benefits would seldom have been conferred。 The important rank； among human evils and wrongs； of th