on sophistical refutations- 第13部分

because　he　happens　to　be　both　yours　and　a　child；　but　he　is　not　'your



child'。



　　There　is　also　the　proof　that　'something　〃of　evils〃　is　good'；　for



wisdom　is　a　'knowledge　〃of　evils〃'。　But　the　expression　that　this　is



'of　so　and…so'　（='so…and…so's'）　has　not　a　number　of　meanings：　it　means



that　it　is　'so…and…so's　property'。　We　may　suppose　of　course；　on　the



other　hand；　that　it　has　a　number　of　meanings…for　we　also　say　that



man　is　'of　the　animals'；　though　not　their　property；　and　also　that



any　term　related　to　'evils'　in　a　way　expressed　by　a　genitive　case　is



on　that　account　a　so…and…so　'of　evils'；　though　it　is　not　one　of　the



evils…but　in　that　case　the　apparently　different　meanings　seem　to



depend　on　whether　the　term　is　used　relatively　or　absolutely。　'Yet　it



is　conceivably　possible　to　find　a　real　ambiguity　in　the　phrase



〃Something　of　evils　is　good〃。'　Perhaps；　but　not　with　regard　to　the



phrase　in　question。　It　would　occur　more　nearly；　suppose　that　'A



servant　is　good　of　the　wicked'；　though　perhaps　it　is　not　quite　found



even　there：　for　a　thing　may　be　'good'　and　be　'X's'　without　being　at



the　same　time　'X's　good'。　Nor　is　the　saying　that　'Man　is　of　the



animals'　a　phrase　with　a　number　of　meanings：　for　a　phrase　does　not



become　possessed　of　a　number　of　meanings　merely　suppose　we　express



it　elliptically：　for　we　express　'Give　me　the　Iliad'　by　quoting　half



a　line　of　it；　e。g。　'Give　me　〃Sing；　goddess；　of　the　wrath。。。〃'







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　　Those　arguments　which　depend　upon　an　expression　that　is　valid　of　a



particular　thing；　or　in　a　particular　respect；　or　place；　or　manner；



or　relation；　and　not　valid　absolutely；　should　be　solved　by　considering



the　conclusion　in　relation　to　its　contradictory；　to　see　if　any　of



these　things　can　possibly　have　happened　to　it。　For　it　is　impossible



for　contraries　and　opposites　and　an　affirmative　and　a　negative　to



belong　to　the　same　thing　absolutely；　there　is；　however；　nothing　to



prevent　each　from　belonging　in　a　particular　respect　or　relation　or



manner；　or　to　prevent　one　of　them　from　belonging　in　a　particular



respect　and　the　other　absolutely。　So　that　if　this　one　belongs



absolutely　and　that　one　in　a　particular　respect；　there　is　as　yet　no



refutation。　This　is　a　feature　one　has　to　find　in　the　conclusion　by



examining　it　in　comparison　with　its　contradictory。



　　All　arguments　of　the　following　kind　have　this　feature：　'Is　it



possible　for　what　is…not　to　be？　〃No。〃　But；　you　see；　it　is　something；



despite　its　not　being。'　Likewise　also；　Being　will　not　be；　for　it



will　not　he　some　particular　form　of　being。　Is　it　possible　for　the　same



man　at　the　same　time　to　be　a　keeper　and　a　breaker　of　his　oath？'　'Can



the　same　man　at　the　same　time　both　obey　and　disobey　the　same　man？'



Or　isn't　it　the　case　that　being　something　in　particular　and　Being



are　not　the　same？　On　the　other　hand；　Not…being；　even　if　it　be



something；　need　not　also　have　absolute　'being'　as　well。　Nor　if　a　man



keeps　his　oath　in　this　particular　instance　or　in　this　particular



respect；　is　he　bound　also　to　be　a　keeper　of　oaths　absolutely；　but　he



who　swears　that　he　will　break　his　oath；　and　then　breaks　it；　keeps　this



particular　oath　only；　he　is　not　a　keeper　of　his　oath：　nor　is　the



disobedient　man　'obedient'；　though　he　obeys　one　particular　command。



The　argument　is　similar；　also；　as　regards　the　problem　whether　the　same



man　can　at　the　same　time　say　what　is　both　false　and　true：　but　it



appears　to　be　a　troublesome　question　because　it　is　not　easy　to　see



in　which　of　the　two　connexions　the　word　'absolutely'　is　to　be



rendered…with　'true'　or　with　'false'。　There　is；　however；　nothing　to



prevent　it　from　being　false　absolutely；　though　true　in　some　particular



respect　or　relation；　i。e。　being　true　in　some　things；　though　not　'true'



absolutely。　Likewise　also　in　cases　of　some　particular　relation　and



place　and　time。　For　all　arguments　of　the　following　kind　depend　upon



this。'　Is　health；　or　wealth；　a　good　thing？'　'Yes。'　'But　to　the　fool



who　does　not　use　it　aright　it　is　not　a　good　thing：　therefore　it　is



both　good　and　not　good。'　'Is　health；　or　political　power；　a　good



thing？'　'Yes。　〃But　sometimes　it　is　not　particularly　good：　therefore



the　same　thing　is　both　good　and　not　good　to　the　same　man。'　Or　rather



there　is　nothing　to　prevent　a　thing；　though　good　absolutely；　being　not



good　to　a　particular　man；　or　being　good　to　a　particular　man；　and　yet



not　good　or　here。　'Is　that　which　the　prudent　man　would　not　wish；　an



evil？'　'Yes。'　'But　to　get　rid　of；　he　would　not　wish　the　good：



therefore　the　good　is　an　evil。'　But　that　is　a　mistake；　for　it　is　not



the　same　thing　to　say　'The　good　is　an　evil'　and　'to　get　rid　of　the



good　is　an　evil'。　Likewise　also　the　argument　of　the　thief　is　mistaken。



For　it　is　not　the　case　that　if　the　thief　is　an　evil　thing；　acquiring



things　is　also　evil：　what　he　wishes；　therefore；　is　not　what　is　evil



but　what　is　good；　for　to　acquire　something　good　is　good。　Also；　disease



is　an　evil　thing；　but　not　to　get　rid　of　disease。　'Is　the　just



preferable　to　the　unjust；　and　what　takes　place　justly　to　what　takes



place　unjustly？　'Yes。'　'But　to　to　be　put　to　death　unjustly　is



preferable。'　'Is　it　just　that　each　should　have　his　own？'　'Yes。'　'But



whatever　decisions　a　man　comes　to　on　the　strength　of　his　personal



opinion；　even　if　it　be　a　false　opinion；　are　valid　in　law：　therefore



the　same　result　is　both　just　and　unjust。'　Also；　should　one　decide　in



favour　of　him　who　says　what　is　unjust？'　'The　former。'　'But　you　see；　it



is　just　for　the　injured　party　to　say　fully　the　things　he　has　suffered；



and　these　are　fallacies。　For　because　to　suffer　a　thing　unjustly　is



preferable；　unjust　ways　are　not　therefore　preferable；　though　in　this



particular　case　the　unjust　may　very　well　be　better　than　the　just。



Also；　to　have　one's　own　is　just；　while　to　have　what　is　another's　is



not　just：　all　the　same；　the　decision　in　question　may　very　well　be　a



just　decision；　whatever　it　be　that　the　opinion　of　the　man　who　gave　the



decision　supports：　for　because　it　is　just　in　this　particular　case　or



in　this　particular　manner；　it　is　not　also　just　absolutely。　Likewise



also；　though　things　are　unjust；　there　is　nothing　to　prevent　the



speaking　of　them　being　just：　for　because　to　speak　of　things　is　just；



there　is　no　necessity　that　the　things　should　be　just；　any　more　than



because　to　speak　of　things　be　of　use；　the　things　need　be　of　use。



Likewise　also　in　the　case　of　what　is　just。　So　that　it　is　not　the



case　that　because　the　things　spoken　of　are　unjust；　the　victory　goes　to



him　who　speaks　unjust　things：　for　he　speaks　of　things　that　are　just　to



speak　of；　though　absolutely；　i。e。　to　suffer；　they　are　unjust。







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　　Refutations　that　depend　on　the　definition　of　a　refutation　must；



according　to　the　plan　sketched　above；　be　met　by　comparing　together　the



conclusion　with　its　contradictory；　and　seeing　that　it　shall　involve



the　same　attribute　in　the　same　respect　and　relation　and　manner　and



time。　If　this　additional　question　be　put　at　the　start；　you　should



not　admit　that　it　is　impossible　for　the　same　thing　to　be　both　double



and　not　double；　but　grant　that　it　is　possible；　only　not　in　such　a



way　as　was　agreed　to　constitute　a　refutation　of　your　case。　All　the



following　arguments　depend　upon　a　point　of　that　kind。　'Does　a　man



who　knows　A　to　be　A；　know　the　thing　called　A？'　and　in　the　same　way；



'is　one　who　is　ignorant　that　A　is　A　ignorant　of　the　thing　called　A？'



'Yes。'　'But　one　who　knows　that　Coriscus　is　Coriscus　might　be



ignorant　of　the　fact　that　he　is　musical；　so　that　he　both　knows　and



is　ignorant　of　the　same　thing。'　Is　a　thing　four　cubits　long　greater



than　a　thing　three　cubits　long？'　'Yes。'　'But　a　thing　might　grow　from



three　to　four　cubits　in　length；　'now　what　is　'greater'　is　greater　than



a　'less'：　accordingly　the　thing　in　question　will　be　both　greater　and



less　than　itself　in　the　same　respect。







　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　27







　　As　to　refutations　that　depend　on　begging　and　assuming　the　original



point　to　be　proved；　suppose　the　nature　of　the　question　to　be



obvious；　one　should　not　grant　it；　even　though　it　be　a　view　generally



held；　but　should　tell　him　the　truth。　Suppose；　however；　that　it　escapes



one；　then；　thanks　to　the　badness　of　arguments　of　that　kind；　one　should



make　one's　error　recoil　upon　the　questioner；　and　say　that　he　has



brought　no　argument：　for　a　refutation　must　be　proved　independently



of　the　original　point。　Secondly；　one　should　say　that　the　point　was



granted　under　the　impression　that　he　intended　not　to　use　it　as　a



premiss；　but　to　reason　against　it；　in　the　opposite　way　from　that



adopted　in　refutations　on　side　issues。







　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　28







　　Also；　those　refutations　that　bring　one　to　their