on sophistical refutations- 第15部分

case。　'When　you　have　understanding　of　anything；　do　you　understand　it？'



'Yes。'　'But　you　have　understanding　of　a　stone：　therefore　you



understand　of　a　stone。'　No：　the　one　phrase　is　in　the　genitive；　'of　a



stone'；　while　the　other　is　in　the　accusative；　'a　stone'：　and　what



was　granted　was　that　'you　understand　that；　not　of　that；　of　which　you



have　understanding'；　so　that　you　understand　not　'of　a　stone'；　but　'the



stone'。



　　Thus　that　arguments　of　this　kind　do　not　prove　solecism　but　merely



appear　to　do　so；　and　both　why　they　so　appear　and　how　you　should　meet



them；　is　clear　from　what　has　been　said。







　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　33







　　We　must　also　observe　that　of　all　the　arguments　aforesaid　it　is



easier　with　some　to　see　why　and　where　the　reasoning　leads　the　hearer



astray；　while　with　others　it　is　more　difficult；　though　often　they



are　the　same　arguments　as　the　former。　For　we　must　call　an　argument　the



same　if　it　depends　upon　the　same　point；　but　the　same　argument　is　apt



to　be　thought　by　some　to　depend　on　diction；　by　others　on　accident；　and



by　others　on　something　else；　because　each　of　them；　when　worked　with



different　terms；　is　not　so　clear　as　it　was。　Accordingly；　just　as　in



fallacies　that　depend　on　ambiguity；　which　are　generally　thought　to



be　the　silliest　form　of　fallacy；　some　are　clear　even　to　the　man　in　the



street　（for　humorous　phrases　nearly　all　depend　on　diction；　e。g。　'The



man　got　the　cart　down　from　the　stand'；　and　'Where　are　you　bound？'



'To　the　yard　arm'；　and　'Which　cow　will　calve　afore？'　'Neither；　but



both　behind；'　and　'Is　the　North　wind　clear？'　'No；　indeed；　for　it　has



murdered　the　beggar　and　the　merchant。〃　Is　he　a　Good　enough…King？'　'No；



indeed；　a　Rob…son'：　and　so　with　the　great　majority　of　the　rest　as



well）；　while　others　appear　to　elude　the　most　expert　（and　it　is　a



symptom　of　this　that　they　often　fight　about　their　terms；　e。g。



whether　the　meaning　of　'Being'　and　'One'　is　the　same　in　all　their



applications　or　different；　for　some　think　that　'Being'　and　'One'



mean　the　same；　while　others　solve　the　argument　of　Zeno　and



Parmenides　by　asserting　that　'One'　and　'Being'　are　used　in　a　number　of



senses）；　likewise　also　as　regards　fallacies　of　Accident　and　each　of



the　other　types；　some　of　the　arguments　will　be　easier　to　see　while



others　are　more　difficult；　also　to　grasp　to　which　class　a　fallacy



belongs；　and　whether　it　is　a　refutation　or　not　a　refutation；　is　not



equally　easy　in　all　cases。



　　An　incisive　argument　is　one　which　produces　the　greatest



perplexity：　for　this　is　the　one　with　the　sharpest　fang。　Now　perplexity



is　twofold；　one　which　occurs　in　reasoned　arguments；　respecting　which



of　the　propositions　asked　one　is　to　demolish；　and　the　other　in



contentious　arguments；　respecting　the　manner　in　which　one　is　to　assent



to　what　is　propounded。　Therefore　it　is　in　syllogistic　arguments　that



the　more　incisive　ones　produce　the　keenest　heart…searching。　Now　a



syllogistic　argument　is　most　incisive　if　from　premisses　that　are　as



generally　accepted　as　possible　it　demolishes　a　conclusion　that　is



accepted　as　generally　as　possible。　For　the　one　argument；　if　the



contradictory　is　changed　about；　makes　all　the　resulting　syllogisms



alike　in　character：　for　always　from　premisses　that　are　generally



accepted　it　will　prove　a　conclusion；　negative　or　positive　as　the



case　may　be；　that　is　just　as　generally　accepted；　and　therefore　one



is　bound　to　feel　perplexed。　An　argument；　then；　of　this　kind　is　the



most　incisive；　viz。　the　one　that　puts　its　conclusion　on　all　fours　with



the　propositions　asked；　and　second　comes　the　one　that　argues　from



premisses；　all　of　which　are　equally　convincing：　for　this　will



produce　an　equal　perplexity　as　to　what　kind　of　premiss；　of　those



asked；　one　should　demolish。　Herein　is　a　difficulty：　for　one　must



demolish　something；　but　what　one　must　demolish　is　uncertain。　Of



contentious　arguments；　on　the　other　hand；　the　most　incisive　is　the　one



which；　in　the　first　place；　is　characterized　by　an　initial



uncertainty　whether　it　has　been　properly　reasoned　or　not；　and　also



whether　the　solution　depends　on　a　false　premiss　or　on　the　drawing　of　a



distinction；　while；　of　the　rest；　the　second　place　is　held　by　that



whose　solution　clearly　depends　upon　a　distinction　or　a　demolition；　and



yet　it　does　not　reveal　clearly　which　it　is　of　the　premisses　asked；



whose　demolition；　or　the　drawing　of　a　distinction　within　it；　will



bring　the　solution　about；　but　even　leaves　it　vague　whether　it　is　on



the　conclusion　or　on　one　of　the　premisses　that　the　deception　depends。



　　Now　sometimes　an　argument　which　has　not　been　properly　reasoned　is



silly；　supposing　the　assumptions　required　to　be　extremely　contrary



to　the　general　view　or　false；　but　sometimes　it　ought　not　to　be　held　in



contempt。　For　whenever　some　question　is　left　out；　of　the　kind　that



concerns　both　the　subject　and　the　nerve　of　the　argument；　the　reasoning



that　has　both　failed　to　secure　this　as　well；　and　also　failed　to　reason



properly；　is　silly；　but　when　what　is　omitted　is　some　extraneous



question；　then　it　is　by　no　means　to　be　lightly　despised；　but　the



argument　is　quite　respectable；　though　the　questioner　has　not　put　his



questions　well。



　　Just　as　it　is　possible　to　bring　a　solution　sometimes　against　the



argument；　at　others　against　the　questioner　and　his　mode　of



questioning；　and　at　others　against　neither　of　these；　likewise　also



it　is　possible　to　marshal　one's　questions　and　reasoning　both　against



the　thesis；　and　against　the　answerer　and　against　the　time；　whenever



the　solution　requires　a　longer　time　to　examine　than　the　period



available。







　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　34







　　As　to　the　number；　then；　and　kind　of　sources　whence　fallacies　arise



in　discussion；　and　how　we　are　to　show　that　our　opponent　is



committing　a　fallacy　and　make　him　utter　paradoxes；　moreover；　by　the



use　of　what　materials　solescism　is　brought　about；　and　how　to



question　and　what　is　the　way　to　arrange　the　questions；　moreover；　as　to



the　question　what　use　is　served　by　all　arguments　of　this　kind；　and



concerning　the　answerer's　part；　both　as　a　whole　in　general；　and　in



particular　how　to　solve　arguments　and　solecisms…on　all　these　things



let　the　foregoing　discussion　suffice。　It　remains　to　recall　our



original　proposal　and　to　bring　our　discussion　to　a　close　with　a　few



words　upon　it。



　　Our　programme　was；　then；　to　discover　some　faculty　of　reasoning　about



any　theme　put　before　us　from　the　most　generally　accepted　premisses



that　there　are。　For　that　is　the　essential　task　of　the　art　of



discussion　（dialectic）　and　of　examination　（peirastic）。　Inasmuch；



however；　as　it　is　annexed　to　it；　on　account　of　the　near　presence　of



the　art　of　sophistry　（sophistic）；　not　only　to　be　able　to　conduct　an



examination　dialectically　but　also　with　a　show　of　knowledge；　we



therefore　proposed　for　our　treatise　not　only　the　aforesaid　aim　of



being　able　to　exact　an　account　of　any　view；　but　also　the　aim　of



ensuring　that　in　standing　up　to　an　argument　we　shall　defend　our　thesis



in　the　same　manner　by　means　of　views　as　generally　held　as　possible。



The　reason　of　this　we　have　explained；　for　this；　too；　was　why



Socrates　used　to　ask　questions　and　not　to　answer　them；　for　he　used



to　confess　that　he　did　not　know。　We　have　made　clear；　in　the　course



of　what　precedes；　the　number　both　of　the　points　with　reference　to



which；　and　of　the　materials　from　which；　this　will　be　accomplished；　and



also　from　what　sources　we　can　become　well　supplied　with　these：　we　have



shown；　moreover；　how　to　question　or　arrange　the　questioning　as　a



whole；　and　the　problems　concerning　the　answers　and　solutions　to　be



used　against　the　reasonings　of　the　questioner。　We　have　also　cleared　up



the　problems　concerning　all　other　matters　that　belong　to　the　same



inquiry　into　arguments。　In　addition　to　this　we　have　been　through　the



subject　of　Fallacies；　as　we　have　already　stated　above。



　　That　our　programme；　then；　has　been　adequately　completed　is　clear。



But　we　must　not　omit　to　notice　what　has　happened　in　regard　to　this



inquiry。　For　in　the　case　of　all　discoveries　the　results　of　previous



labours　that　have　been　handed　down　from　others　have　been　advanced



bit　by　bit　by　those　who　have　taken　them　on；　whereas　the　original



discoveries　generally　make　advance　that　is　small　at　first　though



much　more　useful　than　the　development　which　later　springs　out　of　them。



For　it　may　be　that　in　everything；　as　the　saying　is；　'the　first　start



is　the　main　part'：　and　for　this　reason　also　it　is　the　most



difficult；　for　in　proportion　as　it　is　most　potent　in　its　influence；　so



it　is　smallest　in　its　compass　and　therefore　most　difficult　to　see：



whereas　when　this　is　once　discovered；　it　is　easier　to　add　and



develop　the　remainder　in　connexion　with　it。　This　is　in　fact　what　has



happened　in