on sophistical refutations- 第9部分

　　We　have　now　therefore　dealt　with　the　sources　of　questions；　and　the



methods　of　questioning　in　contentious　disputations：　next　we　have　to



speak　of　answering；　and　of　how　solutions　should　be　made；　and　of　what



requires　them；　and　of　what　use　is　served　by　arguments　of　this　kind。



　　The　use　of　them；　then；　is；　for　philosophy；　twofold。　For　in　the　first



place；　since　for　the　most　part　they　depend　upon　the　expression；　they



put　us　in　a　better　condition　for　seeing　in　how　many　senses　any　term　is



used；　and　what　kind　of　resemblances　and　what　kind　of　differences　occur



between　things　and　between　their　names。　In　the　second　place　they　are



useful　for　one's　own　personal　researches；　for　the　man　who　is　easily



committed　to　a　fallacy　by　some　one　else；　and　does　not　perceive　it；



is　likely　to　incur　this　fate　of　himself　also　on　many　occasions。



Thirdly　and　lastly；　they　further　contribute　to　one's　reputation；



viz。　the　reputation　of　being　well　trained　in　everything；　and　not



inexperienced　in　anything：　for　that　a　party　to　arguments　should　find



fault　with　them；　if　he　cannot　definitely　point　out　their　weakness；



creates　a　suspicion；　making　it　seem　as　though　it　were　not　the　truth　of



the　matter　but　merely　inexperience　that　put　him　out　of　temper。



　　Answerers　may　clearly　see　how　to　meet　arguments　of　this　kind；　if　our



previous　account　was　right　of　the　sources　whence　fallacies　came；　and



also　our　distinctions　adequate　of　the　forms　of　dishonesty　in　putting



questions。　But　it　is　not　the　same　thing　take　an　argument　in　one's　hand



and　then　to　see　and　solve　its　faults；　as　it　is　to　be　able　to　meet　it



quickly　while　being　subjected　to　questions：　for　what　we　know；　we　often



do　not　know　in　a　different　context。　Moreover；　just　as　in　other



things　speed　is　enhanced　by　training；　so　it　is　with　arguments　too；



so　that　supposing　we　are　unpractised；　even　though　a　point　be　clear



to　us；　we　are　often　too　late　for　the　right　moment。　Sometimes　too　it



happens　as　with　diagrams；　for　there　we　can　sometimes　analyse　the



figure；　but　not　construct　it　again：　so　too　in　refutations；　though　we



know　the　thing　on　which　the　connexion　of　the　argument　depends；　we



still　are　at　a　loss　to　split　the　argument　apart。







　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　17







　　First　then；　just　as　we　say　that　we　ought　sometimes　to　choose　to



prove　something　in　the　general　estimation　rather　than　in　truth；　so



also　we　have　sometimes　to　solve　arguments　rather　in　the　general



estimation　than　according　to　the　truth。　For　it　is　a　general　rule　in



fighting　contentious　persons；　to　treat　them　not　as　refuting；　but　as



merely　appearing　to　refute：　for　we　say　that　they　don't　really　prove



their　case；　so　that　our　object　in　correcting　them　must　be　to　dispel



the　appearance　of　it。　For　if　refutation　be　an　unambiguous



contradiction　arrived　at　from　certain　views；　there　could　be　no　need　to



draw　distinctions　against　amphiboly　and　ambiguity：　they　do　not



effect　a　proof。　The　only　motive　for　drawing　further　distinctions　is



that　the　conclusion　reached　looks　like　a　refutation。　What；　then；　we



have　to　beware　of；　is　not　being　refuted；　but　seeming　to　be；　because　of



course　the　asking　of　amphibolies　and　of　questions　that　turn　upon



ambiguity；　and　all　the　other　tricks　of　that　kind；　conceal　even　a



genuine　refutation；　and　make　it　uncertain　who　is　refuted　and　who　is



not。　For　since　one　has　the　right　at　the　end；　when　the　conclusion　is



drawn；　to　say　that　the　only　denial　made　of　One's　statement　is



ambiguous；　no　matter　how　precisely　he　may　have　addressed　his



argument　to　the　very　same　point　as　oneself；　it　is　not　clear　whether



one　has　been　refuted：　for　it　is　not　clear　whether　at　the　moment　one　is



speaking　the　truth。　If；　on　the　other　hand；　one　had　drawn　a



distinction；　and　questioned　him　on　the　ambiguous　term　or　the



amphiboly；　the　refutation　would　not　have　been　a　matter　of　uncertainty。



Also　what　is　incidentally　the　object　of　contentious　arguers；　though



less　so　nowadays　than　formerly；　would　have　been　fulfilled；　namely　that



the　person　questioned　should　answer　either　'Yes'　or　'No'：　whereas



nowadays　the　improper　forms　in　which　questioners　put　their　questions



compel　the　party　questioned　to　add　something　to　his　answer　in



correction　of　the　faultiness　of　the　proposition　as　put：　for　certainly；



if　the　questioner　distinguishes　his　meaning　adequately；　the　answerer



is　bound　to　reply　either　'Yes'　or　'No'。



　　If　any　one　is　going　to　suppose　that　an　argument　which　turns　upon



ambiguity　is　a　refutation；　it　will　be　impossible　for　an　answerer　to



escape　being　refuted　in　a　sense：　for　in　the　case　of　visible　objects



one　is　bound　of　necessity　to　deny　the　term　one　has　asserted；　and　to



assert　what　one　has　denied。　For　the　remedy　which　some　people　have



for　this　is　quite　unavailing。　They　say；　not　that　Coriscus　is　both



musical　and　unmusical；　but　that　this　Coriscus　is　musical　and　this



Coriscus　unmusical。　But　this　will　not　do；　for　to　say　'this　Coriscus　is



unmusical'；　or　'musical'；　and　to　say　'this　Coriscus'　is　so；　is　to



use　the　same　expression：　and　this　he　is　both　affirming　and　denying



at　once。　'But　perhaps　they　do　not　mean　the　same。'　Well；　nor　did　the



simple　name　in　the　former　case：　so　where　is　the　difference？　If；



however；　he　is　to　ascribe　to　the　one　person　the　simple　title



'Coriscus'；　while　to　the　other　he　is　to　add　the　prefix　'one'　or



'this'；　he　commits　an　absurdity：　for　the　latter　is　no　more



applicable　to　the　one　than　to　the　other：　for　to　whichever　he　adds



it；　it　makes　no　difference。



　　All　the　same；　since　if　a　man　does　not　distinguish　the　senses　of　an



amphiboly；　it　is　not　clear　whether　he　has　been　confuted　or　has　not



been　confuted；　and　since　in　arguments　the　right　to　distinguish　them　is



granted；　it　is　evident　that　to　grant　the　question　simply　without



drawing　any　distinction　is　a　mistake；　so　that；　even　if　not　the　man



himself；　at　any　rate　his　argument　looks　as　though　it　had　been　refuted。



It　often　happens；　however；　that；　though　they　see　the　amphiboly；　people



hesitate　to　draw　such　distinctions；　because　of　the　dense　crowd　of



persons　who　propose　questions　of　the　kind；　in　order　that　they　may



not　be　thought　to　be　obstructionists　at　every　turn：　then；　though



they　would　never　have　supposed　that　that　was　the　point　on　which　the



argument　turned；　they　often　find　themselves　faced　by　a　paradox。



Accordingly；　since　the　right　of　drawing　the　distinction　is　granted；



one　should　not　hesitate；　as　has　been　said　before。



　　If　people　never　made　two　questions　into　one　question；　the　fallacy



that　turns　upon　ambiguity　and　amphiboly　would　not　have　existed　either；



but　either　genuine　refutation　or　none。　For　what　is　the　difference



between　asking　'Are　Callias　and　Themistocles　musical？'　and　what　one



might　have　asked　if　they；　being　different；　had　had　one　name？　For　if



the　term　applied　means　more　than　one　thing；　he　has　asked　more　than　one



question。　If　then　it　be　not　right　to　demand　simply　to　be　given　a



single　answer　to　two　questions；　it　is　evident　that　it　is　not　proper　to



give　a　simple　answer　to　any　ambiguous　question；　not　even　if　the



predicate　be　true　of　all　the　subjects；　as　some　claim　that　one



should。　For　this　is　exactly　as　though　he　had　asked　'Are　Coriscus　and



Callias　at　home　or　not　at　home？'；　supposing　them　to　be　both　in　or　both



out：　for　in　both　cases　there　is　a　number　of　propositions：　for　though



the　simple　answer　be　true；　that　does　not　make　the　question　one。　For　it



is　possible　for　it　to　be　true　to　answer　even　countless　different



questions　when　put　to　one；　all　together　with　either　a　'Yes'　or　a　'No'：



but　still　one　should　not　answer　them　with　a　single　answer：　for　that　is



the　death　of　discussion。　Rather；　the　case　is　like　as　though



different　things　has　actually　had　the　same　name　applied　to　them。　If



then；　one　should　not　give　a　single　answer　to　two　questions；　it　is



evident　that　we　should　not　say　simply　'Yes'　or　'No'　in　the　case　of



ambiguous　terms　either：　for　the　remark　is　simply　a　remark；　not　an



answer　at　all；　although　among　disputants　such　remarks　are　loosely



deemed　to　be　answers；　because　they　do　not　see　what　the　consequence　is。



　　As　we　said；　then；　inasmuch　as　certain　refutations　are　generally



taken　for　such；　though　not　such　really；　in　the　same　way　also　certain



solutions　will　be　generally　taken　for　solutions；　though　not　really



such。　Now　these；　we　say；　must　sometimes　be　advanced　rather　than　the



true　solutions　in　contentious　reasonings　and　in　the　encounter　with



ambiguity。　The　proper　answer　in　saying　what　one　thinks　is　to　say



'Granted'；　for　in　that　way　the　likelihood　of　being　refuted　on　a　side



issue　is　minimized。　If；　on　the　other　hand；　one　is　compelled　to　say



something　paradoxical；　one　should　then　be　most　careful　to　add　that　'it



seems'　so：　for　in　that　way　one　avoids　the　impression　of　being　either



refuted　or　paradoxical。　Since　it　is