fundamental principles of the metaphysic of morals- 第14部分

merely　relative　and　arbitrary　ends。

　　3。　A　complete　characterization　of　all　maxims　by　means　of　that

formula；　namely；　that　all　maxims　ought　by　their　own　legislation　to

harmonize　with　a　possible　kingdom　of　ends　as　with　a　kingdom　of

nature。*　There　is　a　progress　here　in　the　order　of　the　categories　of

unity　of　the　form　of　the　will　（its　universality）；　plurality　of　the

matter　（the　objects；　i。e。；　the　ends）；　and　totality　of　the　system　of

these。　In　forming　our　moral　judgement　of　actions；　it　is　better　to

proceed　always　on　the　strict　method　and　start　from　the　general　formula

of　the　categorical　imperative：　Act　according　to　a　maxim　which　can　at

the　same　time　make　itself　a　universal　law。　If；　however；　we　wish　to

gain　an　entrance　for　the　moral　law；　it　is　very　useful　to　bring　one　and

the　same　action　under　the　three　specified　conceptions；　and　thereby

as　far　as　possible　to　bring　it　nearer　to　intuition。



　　*Teleology　considers　nature　as　a　kingdom　of　ends；　ethics　regards　a

possible　kingdom　of　ends　as　a　kingdom　nature。　In　the　first　case；　the

kingdom　of　ends　is　a　theoretical　idea；　adopted　to　explain　what

actually　is。　In　the　latter　it　is　a　practical　idea；　adopted　to　bring

about　that　which　is　not　yet；　but　which　can　be　realized　by　our　conduct；

namely；　if　it　conforms　to　this　idea。



　　We　can　now　end　where　we　started　at　the　beginning；　namely；　with　the

conception　of　a　will　unconditionally　good。　That　will　is　absolutely

good　which　cannot　be　evil…　in　other　words；　whose　maxim；　if　made　a

universal　law；　could　never　contradict　itself。　This　principle；　then；　is

its　supreme　law：　〃Act　always　on　such　a　maxim　as　thou　canst　at　the　same

time　will　to　be　a　universal　law〃；　this　is　the　sole　condition　under

which　a　will　can　never　contradict　itself；　and　such　an　imperative　is

categorical。　Since　the　validity　of　the　will　as　a　universal　law　for

possible　actions　is　analogous　to　the　universal　connexion　of　the

existence　of　things　by　general　laws；　which　is　the　formal　notion　of

nature　in　general；　the　categorical　imperative　can　also　be　expressed

thus：　Act　on　maxims　which　can　at　the　same　time　have　for　their　object

themselves　as　universal　laws　of　nature。　Such　then　is　the　formula　of　an

absolutely　good　will。

　　Rational　nature　is　distinguished　from　the　rest　of　nature　by　this；

that　it　sets　before　itself　an　end。　This　end　would　be　the　matter　of

every　good　will。　But　since　in　the　idea　of　a　will　that　is　absolutely

good　without　being　limited　by　any　condition　（of　attaining　this　or　that

end）　we　must　abstract　wholly　from　every　end　to　be　effected　（since　this

would　make　every　will　only　relatively　good）；　it　follows　that　in　this

case　the　end　must　be　conceived；　not　as　an　end　to　be　effected；　but　as

an　independently　existing　end。　Consequently　it　is　conceived　only

negatively；　i。e。；　as　that　which　we　must　never　act　against　and　which；

therefore；　must　never　be　regarded　merely　as　means；　but　must　in　every

volition　be　esteemed　as　an　end　likewise。　Now　this　end　can　be　nothing

but　the　subject　of　all　possible　ends；　since　this　is　also　the　subject

of　a　possible　absolutely　good　will；　for　such　a　will　cannot　without

contradiction　be　postponed　to　any　other　object。　The　principle：　〃So　act

in　regard　to　every　rational　being　（thyself　and　others）；　that　he　may

always　have　place　in　thy　maxim　as　an　end　in　himself；〃　is　accordingly

essentially　identical　with　this　other：　〃Act　upon　a　maxim　which；　at　the

same　time；　involves　its　own　universal　validity　for　every　rational

being。〃　For　that　in　using　means　for　every　end　I　should　limit　my

maxim　by　the　condition　of　its　holding　good　as　a　law　for　every　subject；

this　comes　to　the　same　thing　as　that　the　fundamental　principle　of

all　maxims　of　action　must　be　that　the　subject　of　all　ends；　i。e。；　the

rational　being　himself；　be　never　employed　merely　as　means；　but　as

the　supreme　condition　restricting　the　use　of　all　means；　that　is　in

every　case　as　an　end　likewise。

　　It　follows　incontestably　that；　to　whatever　laws　any　rational　being

may　be　subject；　he　being　an　end　in　himself　must　be　able　to　regard

himself　as　also　legislating　universally　in　respect　of　these　same　laws；

since　it　is　just　this　fitness　of　his　maxims　for　universal

legislation　that　distinguishes　him　as　an　end　in　himself；　also　it

follows　that　this　implies　his　dignity　（prerogative）　above　all　mere

physical　beings；　that　he　must　always　take　his　maxims　from　the　point　of

view　which　regards　himself　and；　likewise；　every　other　rational　being

as　law…giving　beings　（on　which　account　they　are　called　persons）。　In

this　way　a　world　of　rational　beings　（mundus　intelligibilis）　is

possible　as　a　kingdom　of　ends；　and　this　by　virtue　of　the　legislation

proper　to　all　persons　as　members。　Therefore　every　rational　being

must　so　act　as　if　he　were　by　his　maxims　in　every　case　a　legislating

member　in　the　universal　kingdom　of　ends。　The　formal　principle　of　these

maxims　is：　〃So　act　as　if　thy　maxim　were　to　serve　likewise　as　the

universal　law　（of　all　rational　beings）。〃　A　kingdom　of　ends　is　thus

only　possible　on　the　analogy　of　a　kingdom　of　nature；　the　former

however　only　by　maxims；　that　is　self…imposed　rules；　the　latter　only　by

the　laws　of　efficient　causes　acting　under　necessitation　from

without。　Nevertheless；　although　the　system　of　nature　is　looked　upon　as

a　machine；　yet　so　far　as　it　has　reference　to　rational　beings　as　its

ends；　it　is　given　on　this　account　the　name　of　a　kingdom　of　nature。　Now

such　a　kingdom　of　ends　would　be　actually　realized　by　means　of　maxims

conforming　to　the　canon　which　the　categorical　imperative　prescribes　to

all　rational　beings；　if　they　were　universally　followed。　But　although　a

rational　being；　even　if　he　punctually　follows　this　maxim　himself；

cannot　reckon　upon　all　others　being　therefore　true　to　the　same；　nor

expect　that　the　kingdom　of　nature　and　its　orderly　arrangements　shall

be　in　harmony　with　him　as　a　fitting　member；　so　as　to　form　a　kingdom　of

ends　to　which　he　himself　contributes；　that　is　to　say；　that　it　shall

favour　his　expectation　of　happiness；　still　that　law：　〃Act　according　to

the　maxims　of　a　member　of　a　merely　possible　kingdom　of　ends

legislating　in　it　universally；〃　remains　in　its　full　force；　inasmuch　as

it　commands　categorically。　And　it　is　just　in　this　that　the　paradox

lies；　that　the　mere　dignity　of　man　as　a　rational　creature；　without　any

other　end　or　advantage　to　be　attained　thereby；　in　other　words；　respect

for　a　mere　idea；　should　yet　serve　as　an　inflexible　precept　of　the

will；　and　that　it　is　precisely　in　this　independence　of　the　maxim　on

all　such　springs　of　action　that　its　sublimity　consists；　and　it　is　this

that　makes　every　rational　subject　worthy　to　be　a　legislative　member　in

the　kingdom　of　ends：　for　otherwise　he　would　have　to　be　conceived

only　as　subject　to　the　physical　law　of　his　wants。　And　although　we

should　suppose　the　kingdom　of　nature　and　the　kingdom　of　ends　to　be

united　under　one　sovereign；　so　that　the　latter　kingdom　thereby

ceased　to　be　a　mere　idea　and　acquired　true　reality；　then　it　would　no

doubt　gain　the　accession　of　a　strong　spring；　but　by　no　means　any

increase　of　its　intrinsic　worth。　For　this　sole　absolute　lawgiver　must；

notwithstanding　this；　be　always　conceived　as　estimating　the　worth　of

rational　beings　only　by　their　disinterested　behaviour；　as　prescribed

to　themselves　from　that　idea　＇the　dignity　of　man＇　alone。　The　essence

of　things　is　not　altered　by　their　external　relations；　and　that

which；　abstracting　from　these；　alone　constitutes　the　absolute　worth　of

man；　is　also　that　by　which　he　must　be　judged；　whoever　the　judge　may

be；　and　even　by　the　Supreme　Being。　Morality；　then；　is　the　relation

of　actions　to　the　relation　of　actions　will；　that　is；　to　the　autonomy

of　potential　universal　legislation　by　its　maxims。　An　action　that　is

consistent　with　the　autonomy　of　the　will　is　permitted；　one　that　does

not　agree　therewith　is　forbidden。　A　will　whose　maxims　necessarily

coincide　with　the　laws　of　autonomy　is　a　holy　will；　good　absolutely。

The　dependence　of　a　will　not　absolutely　good　on　the　principle　of

autonomy　（moral　necessitation）　is　obligation。　This；　then；　cannot　be

applied　to　a　holy　being。　The　objective　necessity　of　actions　from

obligation　is　called　duty。

　　From　what　has　just　been　said；　it　is　easy　to　see　how　it　happens　that；

although　the　conception　of　duty　implies　subjection　to　the　law；　we

yet　ascribe　a　certain　dignity　and　sublimity　to　the　person　who

fulfils　all　his　duties。　There　is　not；　indeed；　any　sublimity　in　him；　so

far　as　he　is　subject　to　the　moral　law；　but　inasmuch　as　in　regard　to

that　very　law　he　is　likewise　a　legislator；　and　on　that　account　alone

subject　to　it；　he　has　sublimity。　We　have　also　shown　above　that　neither

fear　nor　inclination；　but　simply　respect　for　the　law；　is　the　spring

which　can　give　actions　a　moral　worth。　Our　own　will；　so　far　as　we

suppose　it　to　act　only　under　the　condition　that　its　maxims　are

potentially　universal　laws；　this　ideal　will　which　is　possible　to　us　is

the　proper　object　of　respect；　and　the　dignity　of　humanity　consists

just　in　this　capa