of the community； of the State and of humanity； in measuring and
locating them accordingly。 With relentless necessity the
conviction always governs us that this classification must
determine the distribution of honors and political influence； of
position； of incomes and punishments。 The similar should be
treated alike； the dissimilar unlike。 It is a reciprocity of
human actions which we demand。 The maintenance of reciprocity
appears just； its disregard unjust。 In an unjust proportion one
part obtains too much； the other too little。 The unjust usurps
too much of the good to be distributed； the unjustly suffering
receives too little。
We call an election system just which distributes political
influence according to individual ability and merit in state and
community。 We call a penal code just which； in spite of the
manifold variety of misdemeanors and crimes； in spite of the
seeming incomparability of the different punishments； has found a
uniformly weighing system which parallels offences and
punishments in accordance with public sentiment。 We speak of a
just gradation of salaries； of a just promotion of officers in
every stock company； in every railroad； as well as in the army；
and in the hierarchy of State officials。 We speak of a just
distribution of taxes； of a just gradation of wages； of just
profits； of a just interest on loans。 And always there is the
same conception in the background： men are grouped and classified
according to certain characteristics； qualities； deeds and
accomplishments； descent and prosperity。 Burdens and advantages
should correspond to these classes。
The profit of an undertaking is said to be justly higher than
the rate of interest； because a greater risk and an indemnity for
labor are therein involved； both of which are foreign to
interest。 Interest on capital is just because the lender foregoes
a possible profit or enjoyment； because the borrower is in a much
worse position without this aid； and because for the service of
the one a consideration from the other seems just。 The high
earnings of the well…known physician or lawyer are just； such is
Adam Smith's argument； because of the large number who go to
great expense in their studies； many have very small incomes； the
chosen； able ones are thus in a manner compensated therefor。
Every house…wife； every servant girl； daily and hourly thinks
this price and that unjust； and this always on the ground of
comparisons； classifications and valuations。 Most important；
however； is the judgment of the justice or injustice of the
condition of social classes in general。
Aristotle calls slavery just when master and slave are by
nature as different as soul and body； as governing will and
external instrument。 Then； he says； it is a natural；
intrinsically justified slavery； the external legal relation of
society corresponds to human nature。 Exactly the same can be said
of all social gradations and classifications。 We feel them to be
just as far as we find them in accord with our observations of
similar or dissimilar qualities of the classes in question。 The
public mind has never； apart from times of error and excitement；
begrudged honor； riches and position to those whose actions；
whose abilities correspondingly excelled。 It found fault with the
condition of the middle and lower classes whenever it observed
that men of the same race； the same creed； the same community；
were maltreated by their equals and were held in a subjection not
corresponding to their education and merit。 All class struggles
of the past have arisen from these sentiments。 The greatest
politicians and popular leaders of all times； as well as the
greatest kings and Caesars； placed themselves at the head of
movements which； originating in oppressed； abused and maltreated
classes； aspired； successfully or otherwise； to a removal of
unjust social conditions。 These class…struggles have often been
only for political rights； for honors； or for marriage rights。
The essential element； however； was always an economic question；
the distribution of incomes and wealth or the conditions and
avenues to them； the possibilities of acquisition； for in the
social struggle for life； economic existence is the most
important factor。
And therefore the question always arises here also； whether
that which is； is just。 Is this restriction of trade； this or
that institution touching the distribution of wealth； is this
entire distribution of incomes just？
This question； indeed； is not always equally emphasized； the
feelings which spring from the answer do not at all times equally
influence the masses and single parties。 The judgment； that a
certain classification and distribution of incomes is just or
unjust； is of course not the only one that is given about the
social phenomenon in question。 Nor is this judgment； even though
thousands are agreed upon it； the only power which rules the
distribution of incomes。 But this judgment is the only
psychological basis from which all demands for the right of
equality have arisen。 It is the basis of all individualism。 From
the standpoint of mankind there may be other demands； mankind and
its interests demand sacrifices in the upper as well as in the
lower ranks。 The practical representatives of this standpoint in
political life must； therefore； necessarily seek to combat or to
weaken the conclusions resulting from this fundamental principle
of individualism。 And from their standpoint they are justified in
so doing。 But equally justified on the other hand is the
standpoint of individualism； and it is this which demands
justice； proportionality of duties and rights； it demands
equality for equal； inequality for unequal men。 The principle of
civil； political and social equality will never have a firm
foundation unless one seeks it in this connection。 Every
limitation of the principle of equality； other than that which is
prompted by the qualities and merits of men； is arbitrary。
Material justice demands equal rights only in so far as it
observes equal qualities； as it presumes the possibility of equal
achievement and fulfillment of duties。
II
Thus the approving or disapproving judgment of the justice of
human actions or institutions always rests on the same
psychological processes。 But the results to which it comes may be
very different。 How would it otherwise be possible that the
conceptions of justice of barbarians； of heathens； of Christians；
of men of modern culture； differ so much that something different
is always demanded under the plea of justice？ Even within the
same nation and the same period the controversy as to what
constitutes justice will never cease； but from time to time
certain judgments will succeed in placing themselves in the
dominating centre of the progressive movement； certain results of
former intellectual contests will descend to posterity as a
secured inheritance； and as long as the night of barbarism does
not break in again they will rule and influence it more and more。
If we now try to explain somewhat more fully the
psychological processes in question； the first step always seems
to be to group in our conceptions a number of men into bodies of
moral community。 These bodies are then compared and tested
according to their qualities and actions。 The equalities are
searched for and found by the judgment； the inequalities and
their degrees are tried by the estimating and valuing sense。 It
is in the realm of the feelings in which all the final decisions
on this most important point are reached。 All feelings finally
resolve themselves into an adjudging or disparaging； into an
estimation and a sensation of that which furthers and that which
impedes us； they are decisions on the worth of men and things。
And upon this now follows finally the simple logical conclusion：
the persons whom I am to conceive as a moral community must； as
far as human intervention reaches； be treated equally in the
measure of their equality； unequally in the measure of their
inequality。
The groups of persons into which our conceptions necessarily
classify mankind are manifold。 The members of the family and the
tribe； the bellows of a society and a community； the citizens of
a State and of a federation； the members of a church and of a
race； finally all humanity in a certain sense can be so grouped；
but only in so far as they form a moral community and pursue
certain common ends。 Whosoever stands without the group is
foreign to the comparison； is not comprised in the judgment of
what is just。 Hence a barbarian does not think it unjust to kill
the stranger； only the conception of a moral community between
all nations and all men prevents this。 Likewise it does not seem
to me unjust that an Englishman pays double the taxes paid by a
German of equal income。 With the variety of different human
purposes and communities the same man appears at one time like
his fellows； at another unlike。 In a club of any kind which
claims but a small fraction of our interest； we see no injustice
in a per capita assessment which we would consider unbearable in
a State or community。 It accords with our idea of justic