in a per capita assessment which we would consider unbearable in
a State or community。 It accords with our idea of justice that
all young and vigorous men have an equal duty in the defence of
our country； whereas for other public and social purposes they
show the greatest dissimilarities； and are accordingly treated
differently。
The judgment of equality or inequality is； therefore； always
a very complicated one。 Not only must the human qualities and
deeds be considered per se； but also in their relations to the
aims of human society。 In one grouping and classification we have
in view only some one certain well…defined quality of mankind； in
another we attempt a weighing of all qualities； we seek the
average human being。 A shipwrecked party； which has saved itself
in a boat too small to carry all； will be apt to value all their
companions equally in the question of life and death； and cast
lots equally for all。 But the provisions which have been saved
will be distributed according to the various needs； i。e。； the
seaman at the oar will be given twice as much as the
three…year…old child。 In a tribe of warlike nomads the bravest
fighter； in the jockey club the best rider； is fairly given a
preference which would appear unjust in other groups of men。 Even
in the family and in the State a certain kind only of qualities
or actions often forms the basis of judgment。 The judge on the
bench cares only for certain wrongful acts； the father who
wishes to bequeath the same to each child； because he thinks this
just； will not deny their dissimilarity in many respects。 The
State； however； will distribute honors and dignities in the
nearest possible relation to the average of qualities most
important to it。 Every election； every promotion is governed by
an average of composite impressions。 The judgment upon a just or
unjust distribution of wealth and income will always rest on a
similar basis。
Whether it be a single quality or action； or a sum of them；
those which are considered are such as relate to the aims and
ends of the community。 And they may naturally be of the greatest
variety； may include； for instance； even physical strength or
beauty。 In an athletic club it seems just to give a prize to the
strongest man； in tableaux vivants to favor a beautiful woman。 As
a rule； however； in social bodies of a higher order those
qualities are to be considered which； like virtue and talent； are
of the greatest service to them； which manifest themselves in
actions advantageous to the community。 Often there are very
heterogeneous qualities to be compared； as the aims of the great
moral communities； especially of the State； are the most various。
The question can arise； is the brave general or the great
statesman； the great painter or the great singer； of greater
Universal value？ The decision is given by public sentiment
according to that classification of purposes which appears at the
moment to be the correct one； and following it we find a verdict
of the public which declares the salary of a general； of a
secretary of state or of a singer to be just or unjust。
Quite as difficult as the comparison of different qualities
or acts is the valuation of the inequalities in the same sphere
of human action。 That the statesman deserves a higher salary than
his secretary； that the head of a great firm earns more than his
cashier； and the latter more than the youngest clerk； that the
designer in a factory is more important than the porter in all
this； public sentiment and valuation agree。 But when the grades
of inequality are to be measured and to be expressed in figures；
which is indispensable in all the practical questions； there will
be many differences of opinion； and from this point of view
indeed the opinion might be upheld that the psychological
judgments which form the foundations of the conceptions of the
just are always a chaos without unity and clearness。 The
objection which we so often meet on the field of aesthetic
judgment seems obvious； that there is no general judgment； that
all is a matter of individual taste； that mere individual
processes of feeling are in question； which are immeasurably
entangled； and which a fool alone could regard as a basis of
public affairs and institutions。
This would in fact be true； if the individual thoughts and
sentiments of men were； indeed； only the product of independent
and isolated individuals。 But every disposition of mind； every
word； every idea； every conception； more profoundly examined； is
the result not of an individual； but of a social process。 The
greatest genius even thinks and feels as a member of the
community； ninety per cent of what he possesses is a trust
conveyed to him by forefathers； teachers； fellow…creatures； to be
cherished and bequeathed to posterity。 The majority of everyday
persons are little more than indifferent vessels into which flow
the feelings and thoughts of preceding and contemporary millions。
Language is a product of society。 By means of the spoken word；
Herbart says； thought and feeling pass over into the mind of
another。 There they originate new fillings and thoughts； which
forthwith cross the same bridge； to enrich the ideas of the
first。 Thus it happens that the smallest part of our thoughts
originates in ourselves； and that we draw； as it were； from a
public storehouse； and participate in a universal generation of
thoughts to which each individual makes only a comparatively
scanty contribution。
Supposing for the moment that the feelings on which the
estimating judgments of what is just are founded； remain wholly
in the obscure realm of mental temperaments； even in this stage
they are not a psychological chaos； but a rhythmic movement of
masses。 And the more they rise to judgments and standards of
valuation； the more the mental temperaments are condensed through
the medium of public discussion； to decisions which possess
distinct characteristics and criteria； the more we have before us
mass…judgments which are not quite uniform； it is true； but still
classed according to masses； grouped according to centres and
authorities； and which are clear； firm and generally admitted。 On
account of the same qualities； in regard to the same purposes；
they give the same results again and again and become the ruling
standards of valuation。
Every period has prevailing conventional standards of
valuation for human qualities and deeds； virtues and vices； it
conventionally values this kind of action more highly than that；
and so demands accordingly in one case greater rewards or greater
honors； in another severer punishments or smaller incomes。 These
conventional standards of valuation are more or less the
starting…point of every judgment of justice。 A new and changed
conception is measured in the first instance by its deviation
from the traditions。 As every fixation of price in society is not
anew the result of demand and supply； but as demand and supply
only try to modify traditional values； so it is also with the
valuing judgments of justice or injustice。 The sum of that which
has been handed down as just； invariably forms the real basis of
all judgments。 A refined intuition of right demands a change here
and there； in opposition to the sum total of conceptions of the
just； this is only a single； but an important point。
In existing customs and in existing law； these conventional
and traditional standards of valuation have their real bulwark；
thus they have assumed a form which firmly； rigidly and uniformly
governs wide circles of mankind； and in that well…defined form
they are handed down from generation to generation。 But they also
can be found outside of this solid ground； they originate
everywhere from repetitions of similar cases and form the basis
of judgments of what is just。 These judgments； indeed； arise
daily and hourly in the mind of every thoughtful man in regard to
all social relations of life； they are not confined to actual
law。 In family life the sister thinks it unjust that the brother
is favored； in every social circle； visits； invitations； even
smiles； looks and compliments are resented as unjust preferences。
The mental processes are the same whether here or on the ground
of actual law。 Everywhere it is in the main traditional standards
which govern our judgment。 These traditional and conventional
standards are the historical precipitate of the conception of
justice of hundreds of millions of men； on whose shoulders we
stand。 Through these traditions the seemingly irregular； the
casual and individual takes firm body and lasting form in spite
of constant transformations and renewals。
From this standpoint we can easily refute the naive objection
that there is no way to apply the conception of the just to
economic matters； because； it is said； incomparable quantities
and qualities are in question； the different kinds of work； the
functions of the employer and the day…laborer being immeasurable
by any common standard。 They forget that the formation of prices
in the market equalizes that which is seemingly incomparable； as；
for instance； an edition of Goethe and a bottle of champagne；
that in every penal code t