part15- 第4部分

considerations。




　　　　　　　　My　situation；　far　in　the　interior　of　the　country；　was　not

favorable　to　the　object　of　getting　this　work　translated　and　printed。

Philadelphia　is　the　least　distant　of　the　great　towns　of　our　States；

where　there　exists　any　enterprise　in　this　way；　and　it　was　not　till

the　spring　following　the　receipt　of　your　letter；　that　I　obtained　an

arrangement　for　its　execution。　　The　translation　is　just　now

completed。　　The　sheets　came　to　me　by　post；　from　time　to　time；　for

revisal；　but　not　being　accompanied　by　the　original；　I　could　not　judge

of　verbal　accuracies。　　I　think；　however；　it　is　substantially　correct；

without　being　an　adequate　representation　of　the　excellences　of　the

original；　as　indeed　no　translation　can　be。　　I　found　it　impossible　to

give　it　the　appearance　of　an　original　composition　in　our　language。　　I

therefore　think　it　best　to　divert　inquiries　after　the　author　towards

a　quarter　where　he　will　not　be　found；　and　with　this　view；　propose　to

prefix　the　prefatory　epistle；　now　enclosed。　　As　soon　as　a　copy　of　the

work　can　be　had；　I　will　send　it　to　you　by　duplicate。　　The　secret　of

the　author　will　be　faithfully　preserved　during　his　and　my　joint

lives；　and　those　into　whose　hands　my　papers　will　fall　at　my　death；

will　be　equally　worthy　of　confidence。　　When　the　death　of　the　author；

or　his　living　consent　shall　permit　the　world　to　know　their

benefactor；　both　his　and　my　papers　will　furnish　the　evidence。　　In　the

meantime；　the　many　important　truths　the　work　so　solidly　establishes；

will；　I　hope；　make　it　the　political　rudiment　of　the　young；　and　manual

of　our　older　citizens。




　　　　　　　　One　of　its　doctrines；　indeed；　the　preference　of　a　plural　over　a

singular　executive；　will　probably　not　be　assented　to　here。　　When　our

present　government　was　first　established；　we　had　many　doubts　on　this

question；　and　many　leanings　towards　a　supreme　executive　council。　　It

happened　that　at　that　time　the　experiment　of　such　an　one　was

commenced　in　France；　while　the　single　executive　was　under　trial　here。

We　watched　the　motions　and　effects　of　these　two　rival　plans；　with　an

interest　and　anxiety　proportioned　to　the　importance　of　a　choice

between　them。　　The　experiment　in　France　failed　after　a　short　course；

and　not　from　any　circumstance　peculiar　to　the　times　or　nation；　but

from　those　internal　jealousies　and　dissensions　in　the　Directory；

which　will　ever　arise　among　men　equal　in　power；　without　a　principal

to　decide　and　control　their　differences。　　We　had　tried　a　similar

experiment　in　1784；　by　establishing　a　committee　of　the　States；

composed　of　a　member　from　every　State；　then　thirteen；　to　exercise　the

executive　functions　during　the　recess　of　Congress。　　They　fell

immediately　into　schisms　and　dissensions；　which　became　at　length　so

inveterate　as　to　render　all　co…operation　among　them　impracticable：

they　dissolved　themselves；　abandoning　the　helm　of　government；　and　it

continued　without　a　head；　until　Congress　met　the　ensuing　winter。

This　was　then　imputed　to　the　temper　of　two　or　three　individuals；　but

the　wise　ascribed　it　to　the　nature　of　man。　　The　failure　of　the　French

Directory；　and　from　the　same　cause；　seems　to　have　authorized　a　belief

that　the　form　of　a　plurality；　however　promising　in　theory；　is

impracticable　with　men　constituted　with　the　ordinary　passions。　　While

the　tranquil　and　steady　tenor　of　our　single　executive；　during　a

course　of　twenty…two　years　of　the　most　tempestuous　times　the　history

of　the　world　has　ever　presented；　gives　a　rational　hope　that　this

important　problem　is　at　length　solved。　　Aided　by　the　counsels　of　a

cabinet　of　heads　of　departments；　originally　four；　but　now　five；　with

whom　the　President　consults；　either　singly　or　altogether；　he　has　the

benefit　of　their　wisdom　and　information；　brings　their　views　to　one

centre；　and　produces　an　unity　of　action　and　direction　in　all　the

branches　of　the　government。　　The　excellence　of　this　construction　of

the　executive　power　has　already　manifested　itself　here　under　very

opposite　circumstances。　　During　the　administration　of　our　first

President；　his　cabinet　of　four　members　was　equally　divided　by　as

marked　an　opposition　of　principle　as　monarchism　and　republicanism

could　bring　into　conflict。　　Had　that　cabinet　been　a　directory；　like

positive　and　negative　quantities　in　algebra；　the　opposing　wills　would

have　balanced　each　other　and　produceda　state　of　absolute　inaction。

But　the　President　heard　with　calmness　the　opinions　and　reasons　of

each；　decided　the　course　to　be　pursued；　and　kept　the　government

steadily　in　it；　unaffected　by　the　agitation。　　The　public　knew　well

the　dissensions　of　the　cabinet；　but　never　had　an　uneasy　thought　on

their　account；　because　they　knew　also　they　had　provided　a　regulating

power　which　would　keep　the　machine　in　steady　movement。　　I　speak　with

an　intimate　knowledge　of　these　scenes；　_quorum　pars　fui_；　as　I　may　of

others　of　a　character　entirely　opposite。　　The　third　administration；

which　was　of　eight　years；　presented　an　example　of　harmony　in　a

cabinet　of　six　person；　to　which　perhaps　history　has　furnished　no

parallel。　　There　never　arose；　during　the　whole　time；　an　instance　of

an　unpleasant　thought　or　word　between　the　members。　　We　sometimes　met

under　differences　of　opinion；　but　scarcely　ever　failed；　by　conversing

and　reasoning；　so　to　modify　each　other's　ideas；　as　to　produce　an

unanimous　result。　　Yet；　able　and　amicable　as　these　members　were；　I　am

not　certain　this　would　have　been　the　case；　had　each　possessed　equal

and　independent　powers。　　Ill…defined　limits　of　their　respective

departments；　jealousies；　trifling　at　first；　but　nourished　and

strengthened　by　repetition　of　occasions；　intrigues　without　doors　of

designing　persons　to　build　an　importance　to　themselves　on　the

divisions　of　others；　might；　from　small　beginnings；　have　produced

persevering　oppositions。　　But　the　power　of　decision　in　the　President

left　no　object　for　internal　dissension；　and　external　intrigue　was

stifled　in　embryo　by　the　knowledge　which　incendiaries　possessed；　that

no　division　they　could　foment　would　change　the　course　of　the

executive　power。　　I　am　not　conscious　that　my　participations　in

executive　authority　have　produced　any　bias　in　favor　of　the　single

executive；　because　the　parts　I　have　acted　have　been　in　the

subordinate；　as　well　as　superior　stations；　and　because；　if　I　know

myself；　what　I　have　felt；　and　what　I　have　wished；　I　know　that　I　have

never　been　so　well　pleased；　as　when　I　could　shift　power　from　my　own；

on　the　shoulders　of　others；　nor　have　I　ever　been　able　to　conceive　how

any　rational　being　could　propose　happiness　to　himself　from　the

exercise　of　power　over　others。




　　　　　　　　I　am　still；　however；　sensible　of　the　solidity　of　your

principle；　that；　to　insure　the　safety　of　the　public　liberty；　its

depository　should　be　subject　to　be　changed　with　the　greatest　ease

possible；　and　without　suspending　or　disturbing　for　a　moment　the

movements　of　the　machine　of　government。　　You　apprehend　that　a　single

executive；　with　eminence　of　talent；　and　destitution　of　principle；

equal　to　the　object；　might；　by　usurpation；　render　his　powers

hereditary。　　Yet　I　think　history　furnishes　as　many　examples　of　a

single　usurper　arising　out　of　a　government　by　a　plurality；　as　of

temporary　trusts　of　power　in　a　single　hand　rendered　permanent　by

usurpation。　　I　do　not　believe；　therefore；　that　this　danger　is

lessened　in　the　hands　of　a　plural　executive。　　Perhaps　it　is　greatly

increased；　by　the　state　of　inefficiency　to　which　they　are　liable　from

feuds　and　divisions　among　themselves。　　The　conservative　body　you

propose　might　be　so　constituted；　as；　while　it　would　be　an　admirable

sedative　in　a　variety　of　smaller　cases；　might　also　be　a　valuable

sentinel　and　check　on　the　liberticide　views　of　an　ambitious

individual。　　I　am　friendly　to　this　idea。　　But　the　true　barriers　of

our　liberty　in　this　country　are　our　State　governments；　and　the　wisest

conservative　power　ever　contrived　by　man；　is　that　of　which　our

Revolution　and　present　government　found　us　possessed。　　Seventeen

distinct　States；　amalgamated　into　one　as　to　their　foreign　concerns；

but　single　and　independent　as　to　their　internal　administration；

regularly　organized　with　legislature　and　governor　resting　on　the

choice　of　the　people；　and　enlightened　by　a　free　press；　can　never　be

so　fascinated　by　the　arts　of　one　man；　as　to　submit　voluntarily　to　his

usurpation。　　Nor　can　they　be　constrained　to　it　by　any　force　he　can

possess。　　While　that　may　paralyze　the　single　State　in　which　it

happens　to　be　encamped；　sixteen　others；　spread　over　a　country　of　two

thousand　miles　diameter；　rise　up　on　every　side；　ready　organized　for

deliberation　by　a　constitutional　legislature；　and　for　action　by　their

governor；　constitutionally　the　commander　of　the　militia　of　the　State；

that　is　to　say；　of　every　man　in　it　able　to　bear　arms；　and　that

militia；　too；　regularly　formed　into　regiments　and　battalions；　into

infantry；　cavalry　and　artillery；　trained　under　officers　general　and

subordinate；　le