fundamental principles of the metaphysic of morals- 第4部分

a　source　from　whence　to　give　himself　a　far　higher　worth　than　that　of　a

good…natured　temperament　could　be？　Unquestionably。　It　is　just　in

this　that　the　moral　worth　of　the　character　is　brought　out　which　is

incomparably　the　highest　of　all；　namely；　that　he　is　beneficent；　not

from　inclination；　but　from　duty。

　　To　secure　one's　own　happiness　is　a　duty；　at　least　indirectly；　for

discontent　with　one's　condition；　under　a　pressure　of　many　anxieties

and　amidst　unsatisfied　wants；　might　easily　become　a　great　temptation

to　transgression　of　duty。　But　here　again；　without　looking　to　duty；　all

men　have　already　the　strongest　and　most　intimate　inclination　to

happiness；　because　it　is　just　in　this　idea　that　all　inclinations　are

combined　in　one　total。　But　the　precept　of　happiness　is　often　of　such　a

sort　that　it　greatly　interferes　with　some　inclinations；　and　yet　a

man　cannot　form　any　definite　and　certain　conception　of　the　sum　of

satisfaction　of　all　of　them　which　is　called　happiness。　It　is　not

then　to　be　wondered　at　that　a　single　inclination；　definite　both　as

to　what　it　promises　and　as　to　the　time　within　which　it　can　be

gratified；　is　often　able　to　overcome　such　a　fluctuating　idea；　and　that

a　gouty　patient；　for　instance；　can　choose　to　enjoy　what　he　likes；

and　to　suffer　what　he　may；　since；　according　to　his　calculation；　on

this　occasion　at　least；　be　has　not　sacrificed　the　enjoyment　of　the

present　moment　to　a　possibly　mistaken　expectation　of　a　happiness　which

is　supposed　to　be　found　in　health。　But　even　in　this　case；　if　the

general　desire　for　happiness　did　not　influence　his　will；　and　supposing

that　in　his　particular　case　health　was　not　a　necessary　element　in　this

calculation；　there　yet　remains　in　this；　as　in　all　other　cases；　this

law；　namely；　that　he　should　promote　his　happiness　not　from　inclination

but　from　duty；　and　by　this　would　his　conduct　first　acquire　true

moral　worth。

　　It　is　in　this　manner；　undoubtedly；　that　we　are　to　understand　those

passages　of　Scripture　also　in　which　we　are　commanded　to　love　our

neighbour；　even　our　enemy。　For　love；　as　an　affection；　cannot　be

commanded；　but　beneficence　for　duty's　sake　may；　even　though　we　are　not

impelled　to　it　by　any　inclination…　nay；　are　even　repelled　by　a　natural

and　unconquerable　aversion。　This　is　practical　love　and　not

pathological…　a　love　which　is　seated　in　the　will；　and　not　in　the

propensions　of　sense…　in　principles　of　action　and　not　of　tender

sympathy；　and　it　is　this　love　alone　which　can　be　commanded。

　　The　second　proposition　is：　That　an　action　done　from　duty　derives　its

moral　worth；　not　from　the　purpose　which　is　to　be　attained　by　it；　but

from　the　maxim　by　which　it　is　determined；　and　therefore　does　not

depend　on　the　realization　of　the　object　of　the　action；　but　merely　on

the　principle　of　volition　by　which　the　action　has　taken　place；　without

regard　to　any　object　of　desire。　It　is　clear　from　what　precedes　that

the　purposes　which　we　may　have　in　view　in　our　actions；　or　their

effects　regarded　as　ends　and　springs　of　the　will；　cannot　give　to

actions　any　unconditional　or　moral　worth。　In　what；　then；　can　their

worth　lie；　if　it　is　not　to　consist　in　the　will　and　in　reference　to　its

expected　effect？　It　cannot　lie　anywhere　but　in　the　principle　of　the

will　without　regard　to　the　ends　which　can　be　attained　by　the　action。

For　the　will　stands　between　its　a　priori　principle；　which　is　formal；

and　its　a　posteriori　spring；　which　is　material；　as　between　two

roads；　and　as　it　must　be　determined　by　something；　it　that　it　must　be

determined　by　the　formal　principle　of　volition　when　an　action　is

done　from　duty；　in　which　case　every　material　principle　has　been

withdrawn　from　it。

　　The　third　proposition；　which　is　a　consequence　of　the　two

preceding；　I　would　express　thus　Duty　is　the　necessity　of　acting　from

respect　for　the　law。　I　may　have　inclination　for　an　object　as　the

effect　of　my　proposed　action；　but　I　cannot　have　respect　for　it；　just

for　this　reason；　that　it　is　an　effect　and　not　an　energy　of　will。

Similarly　I　cannot　have　respect　for　inclination；　whether　my　own　or

another's；　I　can　at　most；　if　my　own；　approve　it；　if　another's；

sometimes　even　love　it；　i。e。；　look　on　it　as　favourable　to　my　own

interest。　It　is　only　what　is　connected　with　my　will　as　a　principle；　by

no　means　as　an　effect…　what　does　not　subserve　my　inclination；　but

overpowers　it；　or　at　least　in　case　of　choice　excludes　it　from　its

calculation…　in　other　words；　simply　the　law　of　itself；　which　can　be　an

object　of　respect；　and　hence　a　command。　Now　an　action　done　from　duty

must　wholly　exclude　the　influence　of　inclination　and　with　it　every

object　of　the　will；　so　that　nothing　remains　which　can　determine　the

will　except　objectively　the　law；　and　subjectively　pure　respect　for

this　practical　law；　and　consequently　the　maxim*　that　I　should　follow

this　law　even　to　the　thwarting　of　all　my　inclinations。



　　*A　maxim　is　the　subjective　principle　of　volition。　The　objective

principle　（i。e。；　that　which　would　also　serve　subjectively　as　a

practical　principle　to　all　rational　beings　if　reason　had　full　power

over　the　faculty　of　desire）　is　the　practical　law。



　　Thus　the　moral　worth　of　an　action　does　not　lie　in　the　effect

expected　from　it；　nor　in　any　principle　of　action　which　requires　to

borrow　its　motive　from　this　expected　effect。　For　all　these　effects…

agreeableness　of　one's　condition　and　even　the　promotion　of　the

happiness　of　others…　could　have　been　also　brought　about　by　other

causes；　so　that　for　this　there　would　have　been　no　need　of　the　will

of　a　rational　being；　whereas　it　is　in　this　alone　that　the　supreme

and　unconditional　good　can　be　found。　The　pre…eminent　good　which　we

call　moral　can　therefore　consist　in　nothing　else　than　the　conception

of　law　in　itself；　which　certainly　is　only　possible　in　a　rational

being；　in　so　far　as　this　conception；　and　not　the　expected　effect；

determines　the　will。　This　is　a　good　which　is　already　present　in　the

person　who　acts　accordingly；　and　we　have　not　to　wait　for　it　to

appear　first　in　the　result。*



　　*It　might　be　here　objected　to　me　that　I　take　refuge　behind　the

word　respect　in　an　obscure　feeling；　instead　of　giving　a　distinct

solution　of　the　question　by　a　concept　of　the　reason。　But　although

respect　is　a　feeling；　it　is　not　a　feeling　received　through

influence；　but　is　self…wrought　by　a　rational　concept；　and；

therefore；　is　specifically　distinct　from　all　feelings　of　the　former

kind；　which　may　be　referred　either　to　inclination　or　fear；　What　I

recognise　immediately　as　a　law　for　me；　I　recognise　with　respect。

This　merely　signifies　the　consciousness　that　my　will　is　subordinate　to

a　law；　without　the　intervention　of　other　influences　on　my　sense。　The

immediate　determination　of　the　will　by　the　law；　and　the

consciousness　of　this；　is　called　respect；　so　that　this　is　regarded

as　an　effect　of　the　law　on　the　subject；　and　not　as　the　cause　of　it。

Respect　is　properly　the　conception　of　a　worth　which　thwarts　my

self…love。　Accordingly　it　is　something　which　is　considered　neither

as　an　object　of　inclination　nor　of　fear；　although　it　has　something

analogous　to　both。　The　object　of　respect　is　the　law　only；　and　that　the

law　which　we　impose　on　ourselves　and　yet　recognise　as　necessary　in

itself。　As　a　law；　we　are　subjected　too　it　without　consulting

self…love；　as　imposed　by　us　on　ourselves；　it　is　a　result　of　our

will。　In　the　former　aspect　it　has　an　analogy　to　fear；　in　the　latter　to

inclination。　Respect　for　a　person　is　properly　only　respect　for　the　law

（of　honesty；　etc。）　of　which　he　gives　us　an　example。　Since　we　also　look

on　the　improvement　of　our　talents　as　a　duty；　we　consider　that　we　see

in　a　person　of　talents；　as　it　were；　the　example　of　a　law　（viz。；　to

become　like　him　in　this　by　exercise）；　and　this　constitutes　our

respect。　All　so…called　moral　interest　consists　simply　in　respect　for

the　law。



　　But　what　sort　of　law　can　that　be；　the　conception　of　which　must

determine　the　will；　even　without　paying　any　regard　to　the　effect

expected　from　it；　in　order　that　this　will　may　be　called　good

absolutely　and　without　qualification？　As　I　have　deprived　the　will　of

every　impulse　which　could　arise　to　it　from　obedience　to　any　law；　there

remains　nothing　but　the　universal　conformity　of　its　actions　to　law

in　general；　which　alone　is　to　serve　the　will　as　a　principle；　i。e。；　I

am　never　to　act　otherwise　than　so　that　I　could　also　will　that　my　maxim

should　become　a　universal　law。　Here；　now；　it　is　the　simple

conformity　to　law　in　general；　without　assuming　any　particular　law

applicable　to　certain　actions；　that　serves　the　will　as　its　principle

and　must　so　serve　it；　if　duty　is　not　to　be　a　vain　delusion　and　a

chimerical　notion。　The　common　reason　of　men　in　its　practical

judgements　perfectly　coincides　with　this　and　always　has　in　view　the

principle　here　suggested。　Let　the　question　be；　for　example：　May　I　when

in　distress　make　a　promise　with　the　intention　not　to　keep　it？　I

readily　distinguish　here　between　the　two　significations　which　the

question　may