fundamental principles of the metaphysic of morals- 第5部分

readily　distinguish　here　between　the　two　significations　which　the

question　may　have：　Whether　it　is　prudent；　or　whether　it　is　right；　to

make　a　false　promise？　The　former　may　undoubtedly　of　be　the　case。　I　see

clearly　indeed　that　it　is　not　enough　to　extricate　myself　from　a

present　difficulty　by　means　of　this　subterfuge；　but　it　must　be　well

considered　whether　there　may　not　hereafter　spring　from　this　lie　much

greater　inconvenience　than　that　from　which　I　now　free　myself；　and

as；　with　all　my　supposed　cunning；　the　consequences　cannot　be　so　easily

foreseen　but　that　credit　once　lost　may　be　much　more　injurious　to　me

than　any　mischief　which　I　seek　to　avoid　at　present；　it　should　be

considered　whether　it　would　not　be　more　prudent　to　act　herein

according　to　a　universal　maxim　and　to　make　it　a　habit　to　promise

nothing　except　with　the　intention　of　keeping　it。　But　it　is　soon

clear　to　me　that　such　a　maxim　will　still　only　be　based　on　the　fear

of　consequences。　Now　it　is　a　wholly　different　thing　to　be　truthful

from　duty　and　to　be　so　from　apprehension　of　injurious　consequences。　In

the　first　case；　the　very　notion　of　the　action　already　implies　a　law

for　me；　in　the　second　case；　I　must　first　look　about　elsewhere　to　see

what　results　may　be　combined　with　it　which　would　affect　myself。　For　to

deviate　from　the　principle　of　duty　is　beyond　all　doubt　wicked；　but

to　be　unfaithful　to　my　maxim　of　prudence　may　often　be　very

advantageous　to　me；　although　to　abide　by　it　is　certainly　safer。　The

shortest　way；　however；　and　an　unerring　one；　to　discover　the　answer

to　this　question　whether　a　lying　promise　is　consistent　with　duty；　is

to　ask　myself；　〃Should　I　be　content　that　my　maxim　（to　extricate　myself

from　difficulty　by　a　false　promise）　should　hold　good　as　a　universal

law；　for　myself　as　well　as　for　others？　and　should　I　be　able　to　say

to　myself；　〃Every　one　may　make　a　deceitful　promise　when　he　finds

himself　in　a　difficulty　from　which　he　cannot　otherwise　extricate

himself？〃　Then　I　presently　become　aware　that　while　I　can　will　the　lie；

I　can　by　no　means　will　that　lying　should　be　a　universal　law。　For

with　such　a　law　there　would　be　no　promises　at　all；　since　it　would　be

in　vain　to　allege　my　intention　in　regard　to　my　future　actions　to　those

who　would　not　believe　this　allegation；　or　if　they　over　hastily　did

so　would　pay　me　back　in　my　own　coin。　Hence　my　maxim；　as　soon　as　it

should　be　made　a　universal　law；　would　necessarily　destroy　itself。

　　I　do　not；　therefore；　need　any　far…reaching　penetration　to　discern

what　I　have　to　do　in　order　that　my　will　may　be　morally　good。

Inexperienced　in　the　course　of　the　world；　incapable　of　being

prepared　for　all　its　contingencies；　I　only　ask　myself：　Canst　thou　also

will　that　thy　maxim　should　be　a　universal　law？　If　not；　then　it　must　be

rejected；　and　that　not　because　of　a　disadvantage　accruing　from　it　to

myself　or　even　to　others；　but　because　it　cannot　enter　as　a　principle

into　a　possible　universal　legislation；　and　reason　extorts　from　me

immediate　respect　for　such　legislation。　I　do　not　indeed　as　yet　discern

on　what　this　respect　is　based　（this　the　philosopher　may　inquire）；

but　at　least　I　understand　this；　that　it　is　an　estimation　of　the

worth　which　far　outweighs　all　worth　of　what　is　recommended　by

inclination；　and　that　the　necessity　of　acting　from　pure　respect　for

the　practical　law　is　what　constitutes　duty；　to　which　every　other

motive　must　give　place；　because　it　is　the　condition　of　a　will　being

good　in　itself；　and　the　worth　of　such　a　will　is　above　everything。

　　Thus；　then；　without　quitting　the　moral　knowledge　of　common　human

reason；　we　have　arrived　at　its　principle。　And　although；　no　doubt；

common　men　do　not　conceive　it　in　such　an　abstract　and　universal

form；　yet　they　always　have　it　really　before　their　eyes　and　use　it　as

the　standard　of　their　decision。　Here　it　would　be　easy　to　show　how；

with　this　compass　in　hand；　men　are　well　able　to　distinguish；　in

every　case　that　occurs；　what　is　good；　what　bad；　conformably　to　duty　or

inconsistent　with　it；　if；　without　in　the　least　teaching　them

anything　new；　we　only；　like　Socrates；　direct　their　attention　to　the

principle　they　themselves　employ；　and　that；　therefore；　we　do　not

need　science　and　philosophy　to　know　what　we　should　do　to　be　honest　and

good；　yea；　even　wise　and　virtuous。　Indeed　we　might　well　have

conjectured　beforehand　that　the　knowledge　of　what　every　man　is　bound

to　do；　and　therefore　also　to　know；　would　be　within　the　reach　of

every　man；　even　the　commonest。　Here　we　cannot　forbear　admiration

when　we　see　how　great　an　advantage　the　practical　judgement　has　over

the　theoretical　in　the　common　understanding　of　men。　In　the　latter；

if　common　reason　ventures　to　depart　from　the　laws　of　experience　and

from　the　perceptions　of　the　senses；　it　falls　into　mere

inconceivabilities　and　self…contradictions；　at　least　into　a　chaos　of

uncertainty；　obscurity；　and　instability。　But　in　the　practical　sphere

it　is　just　when　the　common　understanding　excludes　all　sensible　springs

from　practical　laws　that　its　power　of　judgement　begins　to　show

itself　to　advantage。　It　then　becomes　even　subtle；　whether　it　be　that

it　chicanes　with　its　own　conscience　or　with　other　claims　respecting

what　is　to　be　called　right；　or　whether　it　desires　for　its　own

instruction　to　determine　honestly　the　worth　of　actions；　and；　in　the

latter　case；　it　may　even　have　as　good　a　hope　of　hitting　the　mark　as

any　philosopher　whatever　can　promise　himself。　Nay；　it　is　almost　more

sure　of　doing　so；　because　the　philosopher　cannot　have　any　other

principle；　while　he　may　easily　perplex　his　judgement　by　a　multitude　of

considerations　foreign　to　the　matter；　and　so　turn　aside　from　the　right

way。　Would　it　not　therefore　be　wiser　in　moral　concerns　to　acquiesce　in

the　judgement　of　common　reason；　or　at　most　only　to　call　in

philosophy　for　the　purpose　of　rendering　the　system　of　morals　more

complete　and　intelligible；　and　its　rules　more　convenient　for　use

（especially　for　disputation）；　but　not　so　as　to　draw　off　the　common

understanding　from　its　happy　simplicity；　or　to　bring　it　by　means　of

philosophy　into　a　new　path　of　inquiry　and　instruction？

　　Innocence　is　indeed　a　glorious　thing；　only；　on　the　other　hand；　it　is

very　sad　that　it　cannot　well　maintain　itself　and　is　easily　seduced。　On

this　account　even　wisdom…　which　otherwise　consists　more　in　conduct

than　in　knowledge…　yet　has　need　of　science；　not　in　order　to　learn　from

it；　but　to　secure　for　its　precepts　admission　and　permanence。　Against

all　the　commands　of　duty　which　reason　represents　to　man　as　so

deserving　of　respect；　he　feels　in　himself　a　powerful　counterpoise　in

his　wants　and　inclinations；　the　entire　satisfaction　of　which　he　sums

up　under　the　name　of　happiness。　Now　reason　issues　its　commands

unyieldingly；　without　promising　anything　to　the　inclinations；　and；

as　it　were；　with　disregard　and　contempt　for　these　claims；　which　are　so

impetuous；　and　at　the　same　time　so　plausible；　and　which　will　not　allow

themselves　to　be　suppressed　by　any　command。　Hence　there　arises　a

natural　dialectic；　i。e。；　a　disposition；　to　argue　against　these

strict　laws　of　duty　and　to　question　their　validity；　or　at　least

their　purity　and　strictness；　and；　if　possible；　to　make　them　more

accordant　with　our　wishes　and　inclinations；　that　is　to　say；　to　corrupt

them　at　their　very　source；　and　entirely　to　destroy　their　worth…　a

thing　which　even　common　practical　reason　cannot　ultimately　call　good。

　　Thus　is　the　common　reason　of　man　compelled　to　go　out　of　its

sphere；　and　to　take　a　step　into　the　field　of　a　practical　philosophy；

not　to　satisfy　any　speculative　want　（which　never　occurs　to　it　as

long　as　it　is　content　to　be　mere　sound　reason）；　but　even　on

practical　grounds；　in　order　to　attain　in　it　information　and　clear

instruction　respecting　the　source　of　its　principle；　and　the　correct

determination　of　it　in　opposition　to　the　maxims　which　are　based　on

wants　and　inclinations；　so　that　it　may　escape　from　the　perplexity　of

opposite　claims　and　not　run　the　risk　of　losing　all　genuine　moral

principles　through　the　equivocation　into　which　it　easily　falls。

Thus；　when　practical　reason　cultivates　itself；　there　insensibly　arises

in　it　a　dialetic　which　forces　it　to　seek　aid　in　philosophy；　just　as

happens　to　it　in　its　theoretic　use；　and　in　this　case；　therefore；　as

well　as　in　the　other；　it　will　find　rest　nowhere　but　in　a　thorough

critical　examination　of　our　reason。

　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　SECOND　SECTION



　　　　　　　　　TRANSITION　FROM　POPULAR　MORAL　PHILOSOPHY

　　　　　　　　　　　　　　TO　THE　METAPHYSIC　OF　MORALS



　　If　we　have　hitherto　drawn　our　notion　of　duty　from　the　common　use

of　our　practical　reason；　it　is　by　no　means　to　be　inferred　that　we　have

treated　it　as　an　empirical　notion。　On　the　contrary；　if　we　attend　to

the　experience　of　men's　conduct；　we　meet　frequent　and；　as　we　ourselves

allow；　just　complaints　that　one　cannot　find　a　single　certain　example

of　the　disposition　to　act　from　pure　duty。　Although　many　things　are

done　in　conformity　with　what　duty　prescrib